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ABSTRACT 
Harrison B. Zeff:  Risks, Challenges, Tradeoffs and Opportunities in Dynamic, Adaptive Water 
Supply Systems  
(Under the direction of Gregory Characklis) 
 
The rising costs and regulatory burdens associated with new water supply infrastructure 
are making it increasingly difficult to meet growing water demands through the development of 
new supply capacity.  Instead, adaptive techniques such as temporary conservation and water 
transfers are playing a larger role in the water supply planning.  While adaptive techniques have 
many advantages over infrastructure-centric approaches, they also present municipal water 
utilities with a number of challenges.  This dissertation aims to formulate problems that illustrate 
the tradeoffs between multiple management objectives and help utilities meet performance 
criteria through the use of novel tools and methods.  While this work focuses mostly on a group 
of interconnected water utilities in the ‘Research Triangle’ North Carolina, the results are 
generalizable to water supply problems across many regional scenarios. 
 Adaptive techniques like conservation and the purchase of water transfers introduce 
substantial and unpredictable reductions in revenue (conservation) and cost increases (transfers).  
Municipal water provision is extremely capital-intensive with large, fixed costs driven by debt 
service payments.  Increased levels of financial risk may affect the ability of a utility to meet 
debt service payments, reducing their credit rating and increasing the cost of future borrowing.  
Chapter 2 explores the role of financial mitigation tools in drought management strategies 
employing both conservation and water transfer purchases.  Using multiple problem 
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formulations, we show how the tradeoffs between financial risk and several other management 
objectives are affected by self-insurance contingency funds and a novel type of third-party index 
insurance.  Pricing incentives (i.e. drought surcharges) can also serve as a financial mitigation 
tool while simultaneously promoting more efficient conservation.  Chapter 3 examines how the 
additional revenue raised through surcharges may reduce utility incentives to purchase water 
transfers, potentially harming overall consumer welfare.  In Chapter 4, the short-term 
management strategies developed in Chapters 2 and 3 are integrated into a long-term 
infrastructure sequencing model.  Important interactions between management and planning 
decisions are incorporated using an adaptive, risk-based framework. This dissertation 
demonstrates how the added complexity involved with developing adaptive decision-making 
tools will be crucial to water resource problems in the 21st century.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, urban water supply management strategies have involved maintaining large 
volumes of infrequently used capacity as a hedge against a particularly long or severe drought 
(Gleick, 2003).  However, the construction of large dams in the United States has been on the 
decline for several decades (Lehner, 2008; Avakyan and Iakovleva, 1998), and new 
infrastructure projects are faced with rising development costs and lengthy environmental 
permitting processes (Scudder, 2005).  It will be difficult for water utilities to keep pace with 
continued demand growth in urban centers around the world solely, or even primarily, through 
the development of new capacity (Postel, 2000, Gleick and Palaniappan, 2010; Vorosmarty et al., 
2000; Falkenmark, 1999).  Instead, many utilities are transitioning towards a ‘soft-path’ for water 
management, augmenting infrastructure development with a combination of conservation 
programs (temporary and long-term) and efforts to allocate existing supplies more efficiently 
(e.g. water transfers) (Lund and Israel, 1995; Wilchfort and Lund, 1997; Jenkins and Lund, 2000; 
Jaber and Mohsen, 2001; Zarghami, 2010; Rosenberg et al., 2008).  Diversified portfolios of 
water supply alternatives provide greater adaptability to non-stationary hydrologic conditions 
with less development at lower cost (Characklis et al., 2006; Kirsch et al., 2009; Kasprzyk et al., 
2009; Kidson et al., 2013), but they also introduce new challenges for an industry that has 
historically been dominated by relatively predictable, infrastructure-centric solutions.       
A majority of water utility costs are fixed, attributable to debt-service payments and 
maintenance obligations for large infrastructure assets (Tiger, 2000).  Revenue is generated 
through water rates that often employ a ‘two-part tariff’ (Brown et al., 1992; Griffin, 2001), 
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imposing an inherent tradeoff between revenue stability (fixed portion) and an incentive for users 
to conserve (volumetric portion) (Mohayidin et al., 2009).  Water rates are regulated and 
typically set with the objective of cost-recovery, returning revenues that aim to cover the 
predominately fixed costs of the utility (Beecher et al., 1994; Bishop and Weber, 1996).  The 
challenges associated with quickly changing prices constrain utilities in their ability to adapt, 
making fluctuations in cost and/or revenue especially burdensome to their budgetary process 
(Priest, 1993).  Unexpected reductions in revenue (from conservation) or increased costs (from 
transfers) can be very financially disruptive to these efforts at cost-recovery.  The resulting 
financial risk has serious implications for water utilities.  Historically, water utility bonds have 
been considered to be extremely safe investments and provide utilities with very low borrowing 
rates (Leurig, 2012).  However, potential risks associated with variability in costs and revenues, 
particularly as a result of drought, introduce financial variability that can threaten utility credit 
ratings (Fitch, 2011).  In addition to reflecting poorly on utility management, credit rating 
downgrades result in higher interest rates on utility bond offerings.  Even small interest rate hikes 
can have an outsized effect on utility budgets because bonds typically have long repayment 
periods (20-25 years), and debt service payments make up a large portion of utility costs.  These 
factors act as a disincentive for utilities to adopt soft-path methods which otherwise have many 
advantages.   
The first chapter in this dissertation is devoted to illustrating how otherwise Pareto-
optimal water supply portfolios fail to meet utility-elicited performance criteria when they are 
evaluated with respect to financial risk.  A key contribution of this paper is to show that water 
supply portfolios that rely on adaptive measures (e.g. conservation, water transfers) must also 
include financial tools to mitigate the resulting swings in cost and revenue if they are to meet 
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utility performance objectives.  In addition, results suggest that third-party index insurance can 
be successfully used to reduce the annual costs of these financial tools.  With respect to financial 
mitigation, index insurance contracts are currently used in many industries, such as energy and 
agriculture, to transfer weather-based financial risks to a third party (Khalil et al. 2007; Barnett 
and Mahul 2007; Martin et al. 2001).  Index insurance provides the buyer with payouts when an 
observable, independent index (i.e. rainfall, temperature) passes a given threshold (Turvey et al., 
2006; Kellner and Mushoff, 2011).  When indices can be identified that correlate well with 
weather-based risks, index insurance contracts can be used by a utility to reduce some of the 
financial risk.  This work also involves the application of a contract based on an index that 
accounts for storage and seasonal trends in water demand and hydrology.  This contract structure 
correlates payouts with the risk-based decisions water utilities make when adapting to drought.   
  In chapter one, the financial tools used to mitigate swings in revenue and costs are 
limited to utility self-insurance (i.e. contingency funds) and third-party index insurance.  
However, in some cases, utilities can also employ a set of pre-determined rate hikes (i.e. drought 
surcharges) as a response to drought.  Chapter 2 examines how drought surcharges can create 
financial incentives for utilities to favor either conservation or transfer purchases during drought. 
Drought surcharges are compelling to utilities for two reasons: (i) the pricing signals sent to 
consumers allow conservation to be distributed more efficiently than with simple restrictions on 
water use, like residential irrigation mandates (Sibly, 2006; Grafton and Ward, 2008; Krause et 
al., 2003; Woo, 1994), and (ii) relatively inelastic urban water demand (Espey et al., 1997), 
means that increased prices can raise revenues and partially compensate for the reduced water 
sales attributable to conservation.  However, from a system-wide perspective, surcharges may 
lead to unintended consequences, particularly when alternatives to conservation, such as water 
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transfers, are available.  Conservation is typically viewed by utilities as a ‘more conventional’ 
response to drought, forming the backbone of most utilities’ drought response plans (OWASA, 
2010; Westbrook et al., 2009; Goodwin and Cefalo, 2010; City of Raleigh, 2010).  However, 
supplies are sometimes distributed unevenly across a region, creating opportunities in which 
water-stressed utilities can purchase water wholesale for less than the associated revenue losses 
they would suffer as a result of imposing conservation measures.   Smaller swings in revenue and 
costs during drought could provide utilities with an incentive to make greater use of transfers to 
offset some of the need for conservation.  The use of drought surcharges can mitigate some or all 
of the revenue losses from conservation, providing incentives to stability-seeking utilities to 
favor surcharges over transfers, even if this is not in the best interests of their customers.   And 
although the use of drought surcharges reduces the consumer surplus losses from conservation 
relative to using mandated restrictions, these losses can still be larger than the costs of transfers 
in an absolute sense.  Utilities have no direct way of measuring these losses, however, and the 
status quo bias in favor of conservation as a response to drought could lead to surplus being 
discounted by utility decision makers.  In this way, the use of drought surcharges to promote 
conservation has the potential to lead to a divergence between utility financial incentives and 
those of their customers during periods of drought.  Chapter 2 uses a model of individual water 
consumption to estimate the effects of mandated water use restrictions and drought surcharges on 
utility revenues and consumer welfare for a single municipal water utility.  The results are then 
compared with the costs of purchasing transfers from a nearby source with the intent of 
describing how drought surcharges, which provide welfare improvements for consumers in the 
short-term, reduce utilities’ incentives to pursue alternatives, potentially harming consumers in 
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the long term.  With less of an incentive to purchase transfers, surcharges could also retard 
investment in the infrastructure needed to increase access to transfer sources.      
Long-term infrastructure planning has historically been driven by the need to develop 
supplies that meet growing demands under even the most extreme conditions.  The integration of 
adaptive measures into planning processes requires the consideration of a dynamic response to 
extreme conditions, and the question of when, what, and how much to build becomes an 
increasingly complex problem.  Existing infrastructure sequencing frameworks remain limited in 
their capability to integrate short-term management decisions (Beh et al., 2014; Beh et al., 2015; 
Ray et al., 2012; Mortazavi-Naeini et al., 2014; Kang and Lansey, 2014).  Likewise, 
management actions are often evaluated in static infrastructure environments (Lund and Israel, 
1995; Wilchfort and Lund, 1997; Jenkins et al., 2004; Zarghami, 2010).  Chapter 3 introduces a 
risk-based method for integrating short-term management and long-term infrastructure 
sequencing decisions.  Building off the framework for developing dynamic adaptive policy 
pathways (Haasnoot et al. 2013), risk-of-failure (ROF) metrics used to assess drought risk are 
employed as ‘triggers’ that can be updated as new information about uncertain conditions is 
observed.  Continually updated metrics allow long-term water supply plans to exhibit ‘dynamic’ 
robustness by allowing model decisions to respond to changing conditions (Walker et al., 2013).  
In this work, the ROF metrics are also able to incorporate the effects of model decisions, 
allowing short-term management actions to be influenced as infrastructure development evolves 
over the planning period.  This gives the framework an explicit, quantitative basis for 
adaptation.  This link between short- and long-term actions becomes more complex with the 
consideration of multiple decision-makers that are connected through shared infrastructure.  The 
flexibility of this framework can be used to clarify the impacts individual decisions have on 
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regional objectives and to evaluate the benefits of coordinated decision-making in the short- and 
long-term that would not be possible under traditional methods. 
As urban water demands continue to grow, adaptive management strategies will play a 
significant role in future water supply planning.  These strategies have the potential to be greatly 
beneficial, reducing costs while limiting the impact of development on the environment.  
However, the adaptive decision-making process must be informed by an understanding of the 
tradeoffs that occur across a significantly expanded objective space.  Utility managers must now 
decide how balance concerns over issues as disparate as financial risk, consumer welfare, and 
regional cooperation.  This dissertation provides a number of unique formulations of a traditional 
regional water supply problem that attempt to shed light on these tradeoffs.  The challenges 
facing the four water utilities studied here require novel solutions that could be broadly 
applicable in a rapidly urbanizing world with a burgeoning understanding of the growing 
interdependencies between human and natural systems. 
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CHAPTER 2: NAVIGATING FINANCIAL AND SUPPLY RELIABILITY TRADEOFFS 
IN REGIONAL DROUGHT MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIOS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In many regions of the world, development has reached a point where water demand 
regularly stresses the limits of available water supply (Gleick and Palaniappan, 2010; 
Vorosmarty el al., 2000).  Recent studies have advocated for managing through a wide range of 
options that reduce the need for the continued expansion of supply-side infrastructure (Gleick, 
2003; Kundzewicz et al., 2007; Postel, 2000).  To this end, work in the area of integrated water 
resource management has explored how adaptive techniques, such as demand management and 
water transfers, can be integrated with existing supply infrastructure, often leading to high-
reliability strategies that reduce expected costs relative to supply-side approaches (Lund and 
Israel, 1995; Wilchfort and Lund, 1997; Jenkins and Lund, 2000; Jaber and Mohsen, 2001; 
Zarghami, 2010; Rosenberg et al., 2008; Padula et al., 2013).  Similar research has investigated 
the development of diversified ‘portfolios’ of water management ‘assets’ (Characklis et al., 
2006; Kirsch et al., 2009; Kasprzyk et al., 2009; Kidson et al., 2013), with results suggesting the 
potential to provide greater adaptability to ‘non-stationary’ hydrologic conditions with less 
supply capacity and lower expected costs.  Although these more sophisticated strategies provide 
important tools to facilitate sustainable water use (Gleick et al., 2009; NRC, 2012), they also 
result in highly variable costs and revenues for water utilities (Leurig, 2010).  The resulting 
financial instabilities have the potential to act as a substantial disincentive for utilities seeking to 
 12  
 
implement more innovative portfolio-type approaches (Hughes and Leurig, 2013), but mitigating 
these financial risks is an area that has received relatively little attention in the literature. 
Historically, utility costs have been relatively predictable, with large, fixed costs driven 
by debt service payments on infrastructure investments (e.g. reservoirs, treatment facilities) 
dwarfing the marginal costs of water provision (Beecher et al., 1994; Bishop and Weber, 1996).  
Utility rates have typically been set with the goal of recovering these constant costs (Levin et al., 
2002; ASCE, 2013), but a more diversified supply management portfolio can disrupt this ‘cost 
recovery’ model.  For example, outdoor use restrictions, while an effective measure against 
drought, can significantly reduce water consumption, and thus revenues, leading to budget 
shortfalls as costs remain largely unchanged (Leurig, 2010).  Similarly, augmenting supply 
through the purchase of water transfers can lead to intermittent spikes in cost (Caldwell and 
Characklis, 2014).  These financial stressors are difficult to manage given their uncertainty in 
both frequency and magnitude (Hughes and Leurig, 2013).  This can be especially difficult for 
water utilities, given their regulated status does not often afford them the flexibility to quickly 
raise prices (or ‘rates’) to compensate (Priest, 1993).  More diversified supply portfolios have 
many advantages, but in order for them to reach their potential, utilities must better understand 
and address the tradeoffs between diversification and the consequent financial risks. 
Concerns over the financial disruptions associated with the use of transfers and water use 
restrictions have recently led to investigations of how utilities might use tools such as pricing 
schemes, contingency funds, or financial instruments (e.g., index insurance) to mitigate 
variability in costs/revenues (Brown and Carriquiry, 2007; Zeff and Characklis, 2013).  
However, integrating these tools into wider water management plans requires consideration of a 
number of tradeoffs between conflicting objectives which, particularly when transfers are 
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involved, must be coordinated across multiple regional actors.  Water transfers take different 
forms depending on the regional institutions governing water (Getches, 1997).  For example, 
transfers in the Western U.S. are largely ‘paper’ (i.e. administrative) transactions in which rights 
to raw, untreated water are exchanged (Hamilton et al., 1999; Michelsen and Young, 1993; 
Characklis et al., 1999), while in the Eastern U.S., water transfers primarily occur as the sale of 
treated, pumped water between municipalities (Lund, 1988; Getches, 1997; Palmer and 
Characklis, 2009).  Under these conditions, transfers are constrained not only by the available 
supply but also by the physical capacities of treatment and conveyance infrastructure (Reese et 
al., 2001; Caldwell and Characklis, 2014).  These constraints cause interdependencies in which 
the actions of one utility can have unintended effects on others, driving the necessity for a 
regional analysis.   
 This work seeks to develop and evaluate coordinated regional portfolios across the four 
primary water utilities in the ‘Research Triangle’ region of North Carolina, one of the fastest 
growing metropolitan regions in the United States and currently home to nearly 2 million people 
(US Census, 2010).  These utilities are attempting to meet projected water demand growth by 
integrating water transfers and use restrictions with existing supply capacity.  Included in the 
portfolios is the consideration of the financial instability inherent to such strategies, as well as 
tools for mitigating this instability.  Regional portfolios are explored through an evaluation of the 
tradeoffs between up to five competing operational and financial objectives, all of which were 
identified through consultation with water utility personnel.  Although results focus on a 
particular region, the study’s themes (e.g., rapid population growth, constrained supply, and 
sensitivity to cost/revenue swings) are becoming increasingly common throughout the U.S. 
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(Gleick et al., 2009). As a result, this analysis provides a template for utilities seeking to navigate 
the tradeoffs associated with more flexible, portfolio-style management approaches. 
2.2 Methods 
 This study develops regional water management portfolios for the four primary water 
utilities in the Research Triangle region of North Carolina.  The portfolios are designed to 
address tradeoffs between supply and financial risk by augmenting existing supply infrastructure 
with various combinations of water use restrictions and inter-utility transfers.  Additional 
consideration is given to the use of financial instruments for mitigating the resulting instability in 
revenues/costs.  When restrictions and transfers are combined in adaptive portfolios, it may not 
always be straightforward to determine strategies that provide an efficient mix of alternatives or 
appropriate levels of financial mitigation.  This study builds on prior published efforts that have 
evaluated the effects of increasingly complex water supply strategies (Kasprzyk et al., 2009; 
Mortazavi et al., 2012) to consider the challenges of meeting regional demands, the severity of 
the financial risks associated with alternative management strategies, and the effectiveness of 
financial instruments designed to reduce this risk.  Drawing on the constructive decision aiding 
approach to problem framing (Tsoukias, 2008; Roy, 2010), four water supply portfolio designs 
are considered, with each portfolio design representing a problem ‘formulation’ that consider 
new portfolio actions available to utilities as well as objectives used for the evaluation of 
portfolio performance.   The initial formulation serves as a base case that attempts to manage 
drought with only existing supply infrastructure and water use restrictions (a typical scenario in 
the Eastern U.S.).  Through increasingly complex portfolio design, each subsequent formulation 
illustrates the effects of demand management, water transfers, and the mitigation of financial 
variability on utility objectives during drought.  Formulation II adds inter-utility transfers and the 
 15  
 
coordinated use of shared transfer infrastructure, and Formulations III and IV introduce the use 
of two different types of financial tools.  The analysis is designed such that lower dimensional 
formulations are sub-sets of the higher dimensional formulation, evaluating different possible 
frameworks for regional coordination of drought management, as suggested by Kasprzyk et al. 
(2009; 2012). 
2.2.1 Research Triangle Case Study 
 2.2.1.1 Water Supply Infrastructure in the Research Triangle 
 This study focuses on building regional coordination across the four water utilities that 
serve the communities of Raleigh, Durham, Cary, and Chapel Hill/Carrboro (served by the 
Orange and Water Sewer Authority, or OWASA).  The utilities receive water from nine different 
surface reservoirs straddling the Cape Fear and Neuse River basins (Figure 1).  Most regional 
sources are being stressed by growing demands, but the largest regional supply, Jordan Lake, is 
significantly underutilized.  The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which operates the reservoir, 
designates a portion of the lake for municipal water supply, which is partially allocated to several 
utilities.  Cary, which uses Jordan Lake as its sole source of water supply, is allocated 35.5% of 
Jordan Lake’s municipal water supply.  Durham and OWASA are also granted ‘secondary’ 
allocations of 10 and 5%, respectively, for use in conditions of scarcity (NCDENR, 2002), but 
neither has the infrastructure to directly access Jordan Lake (Figure 1).  Raleigh currently has no 
allocation.  A large portion of Jordan Lake’s municipal water supply remains unallocated, and 
state authorities are investigating the potential benefits of granting utilities increased access to 
this storage.     
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Figure 1: Water supply infrastructure in the Research Triangle region of North Carolina, 
including the service areas of the four water utilities (Durham, Raleigh, Cary, and OWASA), 
surface water reservoirs, water treatment plants, and regional treated water conveyance 
interconnections.   
  
Cary is also the only utility that operates a water intake on Jordan Lake, and other utilities 
seeking access must do so via the Cary-Apex water treatment plant (WTP), with the treated 
water then transferred via a network of ‘interconnections’ (i.e., pipelines).  Previous work has 
investigated the structure and cost implications of different transfer agreements between Triangle 
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utilities (Palmer and Characklis, 2009; Kirsch et al., 2013; Caldwell and Characklis, 2014).  The 
inclusion of treated water transfers complicates portfolio planning by introducing infrastructure 
constraints. The Cary-Apex WTP has a capacity of 56 million gallons per day (MGD), and risk-
based rules for sharing the available treatment capacity among potential buyers are discussed in 
previous work (Palmer and Characklis, 2009).  Capacity sharing rules are based on a weighted 
strategy that assigns a greater share of unused WTP capacity to the purchasing utility with a 
greater ‘risk-of-failure’ (ROF), calculated as the probability that a utility’s reservoir storage will 
drop below 20% of capacity at any point over the subsequent 12 months using current storage, 
historical inflow records, and projected demands.  Transfer rates are also constrained by the 
conveyance capacities of interconnections between the municipal systems.  The Cary system has 
a 10 MGD interconnection to Durham’s system and a 10.8 MGD interconnection with Raleigh.  
There is no direct connection between the Cary and OWASA systems, but Durham and OWASA 
have an interconnection of 7 MGD, forcing Durham and OWASA to share capacity in the 
Durham-Cary connection using the same rules governing the shared Cary-Apex WTP capacity.  
For technical reasons, OWASA must maintain a minimum output of 3 MGD from its own WTP, 
meaning that at least 3 MGD of water consumption must come from its own reservoirs (and not 
from Jordan Lake water transfers).  Conveyance constraints make the consideration of output 
minimums at the Raleigh and Durham WTPs unnecessary. 
 2.2.1.2 The Research Triangle Water Supply Model 
The Research Triangle Water Supply Model (‘model’) uses a Monte Carlo approach to 
simultaneously simulate storage levels in all nine regional reservoirs.  This approach allows the 
model to incorporate detailed operations in the linked-reservoir system, such as infrastructure 
constraints and reservoir release requirements based on seasonality and downstream flow 
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conditions.  The model simulates reservoir levels on a weekly timestep, returning probabilistic 
results driven by the use of 1,000 distinct, synthetically generated streamflow records.  The 
weekly timestep minimizes the computational cost while still retaining the ability to closely 
approximate changes to reservoir levels during drought.  Large storage volumes give utilities a 
cushion against short-term variability in streamflow, and a weekly timestep also roughly 
correlates to the scale of utility decisions regarding water use restrictions and transfer purchases.  
The synthetic streamflow records are developed using a modified ‘Fractional Gaussian Noise’ 
(mFGN) method that recreates the standard moments, as well as the autocorrelation, observed in 
a log-adjusted 80-year historical record (Kirsch et al., 2013).  Many standard autoregressive 
models make assumptions of complete stationarity and impose constant correlation levels 
between each time lag.  Changes to evapotranspiration and/or infiltration, critical in determining 
the rainfall/runoff relationship in a watershed, may impart seasonal patterns on the 
autocorrelation that cannot be adequately recreated using these types of autoregressive models.  
The mFGN approach applies the correlation structure observed in a historic record to an 
uncorrelated timeseries, and thereby more effectively reproduces the seasonal variation in 
autocorrelation required to capture streamflow dynamics, particularly under more extreme 
hydrologic conditions (e.g. drought).  This approach also allows for the generation of multiple 
distinct streamflow records of any length, expanding the range of hydrologic conditions 
experienced by the system beyond the historic record.   
Streamflow records are generated so the model can be evaluated on a weekly timestep 
over the 13-year period from 2013-2025, the minimum period over which the region is expected 
to remain without any substantial new supply expansions. 
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Weekly municipal water demand is computed considering annual growth and seasonal 
trends.  Estimated growth in average annual water consumption, driven by expected population 
growth, has been provided by all four utilities.  Seasonal multipliers, calculated from historical 
demand data, are applied to average annual demand projections to replicate intra-annual trends. 
Weekly variations from these trends are estimated using joint probability density functions 
(PDFs) linking demand and reservoir inflow.  Joint PDFs are derived for each utility from 
historical data, as described in Zeff and Characklis (2013).  Different joint PDFs are used for 
irrigation (April-October) and non-irrigation (November-March) seasons.  
Synthetic streamflow records, surface evaporation, and consumptive withdrawals are 
combined with mandatory reservoir releases and discharges from wastewater treatment plants to 
create a water balance allowing for the simulation of water storage levels in each of the nine 
surface reservoirs.  Because the reservoirs are situated in a linked system, inflows into some 
reservoirs and streamflow measured at monitored gauges include natural flows as well as 
‘controlled’ flows coming from upstream reservoir releases and wastewater discharges.  
Controlled flows are removed from the historical record used in the generation of synthetic flow 
records to create records reflective of only natural flows (NCDENR and Hydrologics, Inc, 2009).  
Controlled flows from reservoirs and wastewater treatment plants are then added to synthetically 
generated streamflows during simulation runs based on the simulated conditions.  Mandatory 
reservoir releases attributable to agreements with downstream users and environmental 
regulators are based on season and downstream flow conditions, while wastewater discharges are 
based on utility water use and the individual treatment plant’s recovery factor, as determined 
from historical records (NCDENR and Hydrologics, Inc, 2009).  Storage models for Durham and 
OWASA have been validated against observed reservoir levels in previous work (Palmer and 
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Characklis, 2009; Caldwell and Characklis, 2014), and Raleigh’s total water supply (municipal 
supply allocation at Falls Lake, Lake Wheeler, and Lake Benson) was validated against model 
output from the OASIS model developed by Hydrologics (NCDENR and Hydrologics, Inc, 
2009) and used by the North Carolina Department of Environmental Resources (NCDENR) for 
planning purposes.  Allocations to Jordan Lake, used as a supply source for Cary as well as 
transfer sources for Raleigh, Durham, and OWASA, are modeled based on inflow, evaporation, 
and consumptive withdrawals only, with each allocation taking (or losing) a proportional amount 
of inflow and evaporation.  Reservoir releases from Jordan Lake are drawn from a separate 
‘Water Quality’ allocation that does not impact municipal supply allocations and are not 
modeled.  
Each utility’s revenue is estimated based on monthly billing data over the period 2008-
2011, which contain consumption patterns by customer class (residential, commercial/industrial, 
indoor/outdoor, etc.) and pricing tier.  Revenue losses are computed based on the difference 
between the potential revenues from unrestricted use and the revenues received when drought-
related restrictions are employed.  The utilities primarily employ increasing block fee structures, 
but some utilities charge different fees for irrigation, multi-family residential housing, or 
connections outside of the city limits. Considering all of these factors, utility revenues are 
determined from a weighted average of use across all pricing tiers, which changes according to 
seasonal water use patterns.  When water use restrictions are triggered, this weighted average 
also changes based on the distribution of use reductions among the price tiers.  Transfers are 
assumed, based on discussions with utilities, to have a constant volumetric price of $3,000 per 
MG ($3.00/thousand gallons or kgal), the same price charged by Cary to their lowest tier of 
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residential consumer.  Durham also charges OWASA an additional ‘wheeling’ fee of $500 per 
MG ($0.50/kgal) for water being passed through their system on its way from Cary to OWASA.   
2.2.2 Problem Formulation 
 
Table 1: Model objectives 
 
Water supply portfolios are designed to explore individual and coordinated regional supply 
management decisions that balance tradeoffs between utility objectives.  Four distinct portfolio 
Objective Description Purpose Formulation ε value 
Reliability 
(fREL) 
Probability that 
reservoirs storage will 
not drop below 20% 
of capacity in the 
worst performing 12 
month period over the 
course of 1000 
simulation over the 
period 2013-2025 
A measure of a water 
supply portfolio’s ability 
to meet water demand 
under drought conditions 
I, II, III, and 
IV 
0.1% 
Restriction 
frequency 
(fRESFREQ) 
The expected 
percentage of years 
over the course of the 
simulation (2013-
2025) when at least 
one week of water use 
restrictions has been 
enacted 
Utility managers have 
noted that frequent 
implementation of water 
use restrictions can be 
logistically difficult to 
implement and politically 
unpopular  
I, II, III, and 
IV 
5% 
Drought 
management 
costs 
(fDMC) 
The expected revenue 
shortfalls, transfer 
costs, and mitigation 
expenses  
To measure the expected 
level of financial 
disruption that occurs as a 
result of drought 
I, II, III, and 
IV 
0.25% 
Jordan Lake 
allocation 
(fJLA) 
The total Jordan Lake 
allocation granted to 
all four utilities 
How much of Jordan 
Lake should be allocated, 
and to whom, is an 
important policy question 
II, III, and IV 2% 
Financial risk 
(fRISK) 
Total revenue 
shortfalls, transfer 
costs, and mitigation 
expenses which have a 
1% probability of 
being exceeded in a 
single year 
Utilities are vulnerable to 
large swings in revenue 
and/or costs: managers 
indicated annual revenue 
swings as low as 3% 
could be difficult to 
manage and 5-10% could 
be catastrophic 
III and IV 0.5% 
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‘formulations’, each adding to the drought management options available to utilities, are 
evaluated with a suite of up to five objectives. The purpose and explanations of the objective 
functions are described in Table 1.  The consideration of all five objectives for each of the four 
utilities would constitute a 20 objective optimization problem, which is beyond the capabilities 
of modern Pareto-ranking based optimization tools (Teytaud, 2006) as well as the cognitive 
limits of decision makers (Miller, 1956).  An effective strategy of dimensional reduction can be 
achieved by reformulating individual objective values into regional portfolio objectives.  For 
each objective, the regional objective value takes the value of the worst-performing utility, 
guaranteeing that all utilities attain an individual objective value equal to or better than the 
regional objective value.  For example, if the regional reliability objective is 99%, then all four 
utilities will have reliabilities equal to or greater than 99% (higher reliability values are better).  
The regional objectives reduce the dimension of the multi-city planning problem while 
guaranteeing that individual utility solutions converge towards optimally identified objectives 
(Woodruff et al., 2013).  The problem formulations, with their respective decision variables and 
objective functions, are summarized in Table 2.     
 
Table 2: Problem formulations 
 
 
 
 
 
Formulation Objectives Water supply portfolio options 
I 𝑓𝑅𝐸𝐿 , 𝑓RESFREQ, 𝑓DMC  Water use restrictions 
II 𝑓𝑅𝐸𝐿 , 𝑓RESFREQ, 𝑓JLA, 𝑓DMC  Water use restrictions, transfers 
III 𝑓𝑅𝐸𝐿 , 𝑓RESFREQ, 𝑓JLA, 𝑓DMC , 𝑓𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 Water use restrictions, transfers, 
contingency funds 
IV 𝑓𝑅𝐸𝐿 , 𝑓RESFREQ, 𝑓JLA, 𝑓DMC , 𝑓𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 Water use restrictions, transfers, 
contingency funds, third-party insurance 
contracts 
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2.2.2.1 Decision Variables 
The decision variables in each formulation describe the operational and financial makeup 
of each individual utility’s water management portfolio (Table 3).  These decision variables are 
used to calculate up to five objective functions, such that 
F(x) = (fREL, fRESFREQ, fJLA, fDMC , fRISK)    (1) 
 𝐱 = (𝑅𝑖, 𝑇𝑖, 𝐴𝑖 , 𝐶𝑖, 𝐼𝑖) 
where fREL = utility storage reliability; fRESFREQ = frequency of the implementation 
of water use restrictions; fJLA = Jordan Lake allocation; fDMC = expected costs of 
drought management (revenue losses, transfer costs, and mitigation expenses); 
fRISK = financial risk (drought management costs reached in highest 1% of 
simulations);  i = utility index (i = 1, 2, 3, 4); R = ROF conditions that trigger 
water use restrictions; T = ROF conditions that trigger transfer purchases; A = 
Jordan Lake allocation (% of available capacity); C = funds to be used in ‘self-
insurance contingency funds’ to mitigate revenue shortfalls and transfer costs ($); 
I = inflow conditions that trigger payouts from third party insurance contracts 
used to mitigate revenue shortfalls and transfer costs 
 
Table 3: Model decision variables 
 
Water use restrictions are used to reduce water consumption below normal demand 
levels.  The restrictions primarily target outdoor irrigation and commercial/industrial consumers 
Decision Description Formulation Range 
Water use 
restriction 
threshold 
ROF Triggers the 
implementation of water use 
restrictions  
I, II, III, and IV 0 – 100 (% ROF) 
Water transfer 
threshold 
ROF Triggers transfer 
requests 
II, III, and IV 0 – 100 (% ROF) 
Jordan Lake 
allocation 
Portion of Jordan Lake 
storage reserved for 
individual utility 
II, III, and IV Current Jordan Lake 
allocation – 100 (%) 
Contingency 
fund annual 
contribution 
Annual amount of money 
put aside by utility for ‘self-
insurance’ from revenue 
shortfalls and transfer costs 
III and IV 0 – 10 (% of utility annual 
volumetric revenue) 
Third party 
insurance trigger 
Specific flow conditions 
that trigger contract payout 
IV 1, 2, 3, 4, or none (stages of 
restrictions that trigger 
insurance payouts) 
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and are implemented in stages, where larger reductions in overall consumption are expected as 
drought conditions worsen.  Total consumption reductions during each restriction stage are 
assumed to be deterministic in the model and are outlined in ‘Water Shortage Response Plans’ 
(WSRP) published online by each utility (Orange Water and Sewer Authority, 2010; Goodwin 
and Cefalo, 2010; Westbrook et al., 2009; City of Raleigh, 2013).    Water use restrictions are 
triggered using the ROF metric (ROF ϵ [0,1]), calculated as the probability that a utility’s 
reservoir storage will drop below 20% of capacity at any point over the subsequent 12 months. 
The ROF metric has been used by utilities in the Research Triangle and is described in detail in 
Caldwell and Characklis (2014).  When ROF exceeds a specified threshold (e.g., 10%), water 
use restrictions are triggered.  In order to lift a restriction stage, reservoir storage must reach a 
level where the ROF exceeds the trigger for that stage by 5% of total reservoir capacity to avoid 
potentially confusing customers by toggling back and forth between stages of conservation.   
Transfers are also triggered using the ROF metric.  When transfer purchases are initiated, 
utilities will continue to purchase transfers until storage in their own reservoirs rises to a level at 
which ROF exceeds the trigger threshold.  Although transfers of treated water are possible from 
any source in the region, all transfer activity in this model originates from Jordan Lake, the only 
regional supply with a substantial volume of unused capacity.  Transfer water is treated at Cary’s 
plant, and moved via interconnections to the purchasing utility.  Durham and OWASA currently 
have allocations to Jordan Lake, but Raleigh does not.  The amount of Jordan Lake water used 
for transfer allocations is of interest both as a modeling constraint and a potential policy question 
to determine how future allocations could be granted. 
 If a single utility requests transfers, they will receive as much of their request as possible 
given constraints to treatment and conveyance capacities.  If more than one utility requests 
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transfers, infrastructure capacity (both Cary-Apex WTP and conveyance) is divided between the 
utilities in proportion to their ROF levels (i.e. high risk translates to more transfers), as described 
by Palmer and Characklis (2009).  A floor of 25% is placed on the proportion of capacity (either 
treatment or conveyance) that is made available to any individual utility.  One benefit of the 
simulation approach used here is the ability to capture the dynamics involved with a number of 
users sharing a source with variable capacity constraints.  
 Lost revenue from restrictions and the increased costs arising from transfers are 
dependent on the length and severity of drought conditions, and the resulting financial impact in 
any given year can grow quite large under conditions of extreme drought.  Utilities can take 
advantage of different options to mitigate this financial risk, including drought surcharges, 
contingency funds, and third-party financial insurance contracts.  A comparative analysis of the 
effectiveness of these techniques is performed in Zeff and Characklis (2013).  Although 
surcharges were evaluated in that work, utility managers have continually expressed pessimism 
that surcharges of the order required to maintain financial stability during drought remain 
politically infeasible. Consequently, no pricing options were evaluated in this work, limiting the 
financial mitigation strategies considered to some combination of (i) self-insurance through 
contingency funds and (ii) third-party financial insurance contracts. 
Contingency funds are a type of financial mitigation that utilities use to buffer against 
financial uncertainties in a variety of areas, some more quantifiable than others, often with a 
single ‘reserve’ fund used for multiple purposes.  In this case, utilities contribute a portion of 
their revenue to build up a contingency fund that can be used to supplement revenues or cover 
additional costs in years when restrictions or transfers occur.  A utility’s annual fund 
contributions are normalized to the utility’s annual revenue from volumetric water rates, or 
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annual volumetric revenue (AVR).  The funds carry over from year-to-year, and unused funds 
are assumed to accumulate 5% interest annually.  Constant annual fund contributions are 
attractive to utilities from a budget planning perspective, but it is important to note that 
maintaining a fund large enough to mitigate the worst-case financial impacts requires annual 
contributions significantly greater than the expected value of drought-related variability in costs 
and/or revenues.  If contingency funds are not designed with extreme conditions in mind, 
extended droughts or a succession of dry years could draw down a fund more quickly than 
expected and leave the utility financially vulnerable.   
An alternative form of mitigation is third-party financial insurance, in which utilities pay 
a third party an upfront fee (i.e. ‘premium’) in exchange for a payout when specified (drought) 
conditions prevail.  Insurance contracts based on streamflow indices are described in previous 
work (Zeff and Characklis, 2013) and use reservoir inflows and estimates of reservoir 
withdrawals to estimate reservoir storage.  When storage estimates drop below the contractually 
specified threshold, payouts are made to the utility.  These contracts are structured such that 
payouts are higher in years when drought conditions are worse and revenue shortfalls from 
restrictions are larger, effectively transferring the financial risk from the utility to a third party 
insurer.  In exchange, the third-party charges a price for the contract equal to the expected value 
of the contract, plus a risk/return premium based, at least in part, on the volatility of the contract 
payouts (Alaton et al., 2002; Cao and Wei, 2004).  By basing contract payouts on storage 
‘threshold’ levels, the contracts are easily scalable to provide mitigation against different levels 
of financial risk (Zeff and Characklis, 2013).  Contracts can be used alone or in combination with 
contingency funds as ‘hybrid’ schemes.  Hybrid schemes allow utilities to insure against extreme 
events with third-party insurance contracts while using a contingency fund (i.e. ‘self-insuring’) 
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against lesser, more frequent variations in costs/revenues using a contingency fund.  By 
removing the need to both keep funds on hand in preparation of extreme events and pay a third 
party to insure against smaller, more frequent financial risks, utilities can reduce the size of their 
contingency funds and the overall cost of third party contracts.  These hybrid schemes have the 
potential to lower the overall costs of mitigation compared to either individual strategy without 
sacrificing exposure to the financial implications of diverse water supply portfolios. 
 2.2.2.2 Objective functions 
  Each objective function is calculated from the results of 1,000 different 13-year (2013-
2025) simulations.  All four problem formulations are evaluated with respect to at least three 
objectives, reliability (fREL), restriction frequency (fRESFREQ), and drought management costs 
(fDMC).  Formulation II introduces a fourth objective to evaluate regional Jordan Lake allocations 
(fJLA), and Formulations III and IV include a fifth, measuring exposure to financial risk (fRISK).  
All five objectives were developed in consultation with utility personnel, who also provided 
input on constraints for some objectives, beyond which portfolio solutions would be unlikely to 
be implemented.  These constraints included (i) portfolio reliability over 99% and (ii) restriction 
frequency under 20% (enacting restrictions less frequently than one year in five).  Although they 
did not identify absolute constraints on financial risk, they also identified that (iii) revenue 
losses/additional cost of over 10% of AVR in a single year could place an extremely large 
burden on the budgetary process.  
The reliability objective is measured as the probability that reservoir storage will reach the 
‘failure point’ described in ROF calculations (< 20% supply capacity).  In the simulation, 
demand is modeled to increase over time commensurate with population growth, causing a 
decrease in reliability in the absence of expanded supply capacity. Therefore, a separate 
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reliability value is calculated for each 12-month period over the course of the simulation.  The 
reliability objective value for each utility is determined to be their least reliable year over the 
course of the simulation, such that 
max fREL = min
j
[min (
y
∑
Vi,j,y
1000
)1000i=1 ]    (2) 
where V = 0 if there was a week in a given year of a particular simulation where 
reservoir storage drops below 20% of capacity and 1 if not; y = year index, y = 1, 
2, 3…13; i = simulation run index, i= 1, 2, 3, …, 1000; j = utility index, j = 1, 2, 
3, 4. 
 
Utilities have also expressed a need to control the frequency with which restrictions are 
implemented to minimize the burden placed on consumers and avoid measures that are 
unpopular with the public.  Restriction frequency is defined as the fraction of years that will have 
at least one week of restrictions over the course of the simulation, such that 
min fRESFREQ =  max
j
[∑ ∑
Ui,j,y
13*1000
13
y=1
1000
i=1 ]   (3) 
Where U = 1 if there was a week in a given year of a particular simulation where 
water use restrictions were implemented and 0 if not 
 
Drought management costs refer to the expected financial impact of all non-infrastructure 
water portfolio assets, including revenue losses from restrictions, transfer costs, contingency 
fund contributions, and third party insurance contract costs.  Although these costs are relatively 
small compared to the large, fixed costs which dominate utility budgets, drought management 
costs are a measure of the expected financial variability resulting from drought management 
efforts, plus any mitigation costs.  Revenue losses from restrictions and transfer costs are not 
counted as drought management costs if there are sufficient mitigation funds (i.e. contingency 
fund accumulation, insurance contract payouts) to cover the financial losses.  For more 
equivalent comparison across utilities of different sizes, drought management costs are 
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calculated each year as a percentage of a utility’s annual volumetric revenue (AVR).  Annual 
values are then averaged over the course of the entire 13-year simulation, such that  
  
min 𝑓𝐷𝑀𝐶 =  max
𝑗
{∑ ∑
𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑗,𝑦+𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑗,𝑦+max(𝑅𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑦+𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑗,𝑦−𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑗,𝑦−𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑗,𝑦,0)
13∗1000∗𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑦
13
𝑦=1
1000
𝑖=1 } (4) 
Where AC = annual contribution to a contingency fund ($); CC = insurance 
contract cost ($); RL = revenue losses from water use restrictions ($); TC = 
transfer costs ($); CP = insurance contract payout ($); CF = available contingency 
funds ($); and TR = total annual volumetric revenue ($) 
 
Although all problem formulations include a drought management cost objective, some of the 
terms drop out of (4) in Formulations I-III.  Formulation I does not include transfers or any form 
of mitigation, removing the terms TC, AC, CC, CF, and CP.  Formulation II includes transfer 
costs, but the financial mitigation terms (AC, CC, CF, and CP) are unused.  Formulation III adds 
mitigation, but only self-insurance through contingency funds, leaving out the terms CC and CP.  
Formulation IV includes all terms as described in (4). 
Formulations II-IV include transfers between municipalities, and an additional objective, Jordan 
Lake allocations, is introduced to measure how much of Jordan Lake will collectively need to be 
allocated to utilities in support of transfers.  The unallocated portion of Jordan Lake’s water 
supply pool is of interest as state regulators must soon make a decision regarding potential 
increases to allocations allotted to regional municipalities.  Due to this focus on the unallocated 
portion of Jordan Lake, an objective is created to account for the minimum Jordan Lake 
allocations necessary to support a given volume of transfers by summing the four individual 
utility’s Jordan Lake allocations, such that 
min fJLA =  ∑ Aj/CL
4
j=1       (5) 
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Where A = Jordan Lake allocation (MG) and CL = the municipal water supply 
capacity of Jordan Lake (MG) 
 
In Formulations III and IV, water management portfolios include financial risk mitigation in the 
form of contingency funds (Formulation III) and/or third party insurance contracts (Formulation 
IV).  To quantify the effect of this mitigation on financial variability, an additional objective 
function is used to measure utility exposure to financial risk.  Financial risk refers to the single-
year drought management costs that have a 1% probability of being exceeded over a 13-year 
simulation period.  In financial literature, this is sometimes referred to as Value-at-Risk (VaR), 
calculated as 
min fRISK =  max
j
{(SYCi ∶ P{SYCi > SYC} = 0.01)j}  (6) 
Where SYC is a modified version of (4) that calculates the largest single-year cost 
over the course of an individual 13 year simulation, such that 
 
SYC𝑖,𝑗 = max
𝑦
(
𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑗,𝑦+𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑗,𝑦+max(𝑅𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑦+𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑗,𝑦−𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑗,𝑦−𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑗,𝑦 ,0)
𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑦
)  (7) 
 
2.2.3  Multiobjective Evolutionary Algorithms 
 Tradeoffs between the planning objectives identified in this work are evaluated using a 
multiobjective evolutionary algorithm (MOEA) that returns the Pareto-approximate (or non-
dominated) set of solutions.  MOEAs have been applied to a variety of complex water resources 
engineering problems (Nicklow et al., 2010), with specific applications to, among others, 
groundwater monitoring (Kollat and Reed, 2006; Wu et al., 2005; Reed and Minsker, 2004), 
water resource system design (Farmani et al., 2005; Suen and Eheart, 2006), and hydrologic 
model calibration (Tang et al., 2006; Efstratiadis and Koutsoyiannis 2010).  This study makes 
use of the Borg MOEA (Hadka and Reed, 2012; Hadka and Reed, 2013; Hadka et al., 2013), 
which employs multiple operators adaptively selected based on a demonstrated probability of 
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improvement over the course of the optimization process.  As a result, the Borg algorithm is able 
to select the most appropriate operators for a given problem and has demonstrated superior 
performance on difficult optimization problems and specifically stochastic water portfolio 
planning (Reed et al., 2013).  The Borg algorithm also uses ε-dominance archiving (Laumanns, 
2002), which allows the user to control the resolution of the solution set and provides theoretical 
guarantees of convergence to a diverse approximation of the Pareto approximate set (Rudolph 
and Agapie, 2000; Laumanns, 2002; Reed et al., 2013).  This ε-dominance defines precision for 
each objective, dividing the solution space into n-dimensional ‘blocks’ (where n is the number of 
objectives) that possess at most one solution per block. 
2.2.4  Computational Experiment 
The large number (1000) of simulations in each function evaluation (FE) was important 
to accurately capture the extreme drought scenarios which typically dominate the planning 
process.  The optimization process entailed 1,000,000 FE to develop a solution set for each of the 
four formulations.  The number of function evaluations explored in this study, while rigorous, 
was more than would be necessary for a utility to apply our proposed framework.   In an effort to 
ensure the Pareto-approximate sets identified solutions that adequately characterized the ‘true’ 
Pareto frontier, a conservative approach was used.  Additionally, the use of parallelization in this 
study dramatically reduced the ‘wall-clock time’ required for each run of the Borg MOEA.  It 
should be noted that parallel processing is becoming more prevalent even in independent utility 
planning processes (Basdekas, 2014) and that this study highlights the value of compressing 
significant search in relatively modest wall-clock time periods (i.e., millions of computing hours 
but approximately a week of actual time).  Table 1 summarizes the epsilon values used to speed 
search and limit the solution sets to a size sufficient for practical decision making (Kollat and 
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Reed, 2007).  To improve solution diversity and avoid dependence on randomness, the solution 
set from each formulation is the set of best Pareto approximate solutions accumulated over 50 
random optimization trials (i.e. 50 seeds with 1 million FE yields 50 million FE per formulation, 
completed in less than 2 days).  The default Borg MOEA parameters were used in this study 
(Appendix A).  Use of the default parameters is justified, as the Borg algorithm has shown to be 
robust across the full parameterization space (Hadka et al., 2012).  This study was performed on 
the Texas Advanced Computing Center’s (TACC) Ranger Cluster (http://www.tacc.utexas.edu).  
The TACC Ranger system contains 15,744 AMD Opteron Quad-Core processors (2.3 GHz), for 
a total of 62,976 processing cores.  The TACC resources were used for diagnosing the problems 
difficulty as well as visualizing the algorithms’ convergence behavior.  Each optimization run 
was parallelized to be run on 1024 processing cores simultaneously.  In total, approximately 2 
million computing hours were expended over the course of a week to complete the study, 
ensuring the best possible approximation to the Pareto-optimal solution set within the limits of 
current computational resources. 
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Formulations I and II: Benefits of Utility Cooperation 
 In Formulation I, regional water supply portfolios are limited to current supply 
infrastructure (Table 4) and conservation via water use restrictions during drought.  This serves 
as a ‘status quo’ baseline, closely approximating a typical utility approach to water supply 
management.  Figure 2 provides a comparison between the tradeoffs that result from the three 
objectives in Formulation I and the four objectives in Formulation II.  The Pareto approximate 
solutions from Formulation I are shown as black points, with color illustrating the additional 
(fourth) objective included in Formulation II, Jordan Lake allocations.  Figures 2A and 2B show 
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the tradeoffs between reliability on the horizontal axis and, respectively, drought management 
costs and restriction frequency on the vertical axes.  Formulation I portfolios are evaluated with 
respect to reliability, restriction frequency, and drought management costs (in this case, limited 
to revenue losses from restrictions).   
Utility Storage Sites Total Storage Allocation 2013 
Demands 
2025 Demand 
(estimated 
OWASA Cane Creek  
Stone Quarry 
University Lake 
3.0 billion 
gallons (BG) 
100% 8 million 
gallons per 
day (MGD) 
9 MGD 
Durham Little River  
Lake Michie 
6.4 BG 100% 27.5 MGD 34.9 MGD 
Raleigh Falls Lake 34.7 BG  
 
42.4% 
(100% of 
municipal 
supply 
allocation) 
57.4 MGD 76.2 MGD 
Cary Jordan Lake 45.8 BG 12.7% 
(39% of 
municipal 
supply 
allocation) 
23.1 MGD 34.0 MGD 
 
Table 4: Storage capacities and demand growth for the four ‘Research Triangle’ water utilities.  
 
The sole use of water use restrictions in Formulation I yields portfolio reliabilities ranging from 
94% to 99.4%, with higher reliabilities corresponding with prohibitively high restriction 
frequencies (Figure 2A) and correspondingly higher drought management costs (Figure 2B).  
The marginal increases to restriction frequency and drought management cost grow rapidly as 
reliability approaches the maximum value of 99.4%.  In contrast, Formulation II (colored points 
in Figure 2) portfolios are able to exploit transfers between utilities as well as allocations to 
Jordan Lake to enhance reliability at substantially lower restriction frequencies and drought 
management costs.  Total Jordan Lake allocations have a floor of 50.5% of usable capacity, 
consistent with the current allocations to Cary, OWASA, and Durham, and reach a maximum of 
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65%, beyond which treatment and conveyance infrastructure limit access to additional transfers 
(as illustrated with the color shading in Figure 2).  The introduction of transfers allows 
Formulation II to achieve reliability values exceeding those in Formulation I (up to 99.9%) using 
restriction frequencies as low as 10% (Figure 2A) and drought management costs as low as 1%.  
It should be noted that in Formulation II drought management costs include both revenue losses 
from restrictions and transfer costs (Figure 2B).  The improvements observed in Formulation II 
correspond with higher Jordan Lake allocation values, consistent with the increased use of 
transfers.  The addition of transfers leads to significant improvements in reliability, cost, and 
restriction frequency.  These improvements are made even with relatively small (<15%) 
increases to the portion of Jordan Lake allocated to municipalities, mostly granted to Raleigh.  
Current allocations to OWASA and Durham are large enough (5 and 10%, respectively) to make 
the capacity constraints of treatment and conveyance infrastructure, and not their Jordan Lake 
allocations, the limiting factor for transfer deliveries to each utility, even under the most severe 
drought. 
 
Figure 2: Tradeoffs between performance objectives reliability and restriction frequency (2A) as 
well as reliability and drought management costs (2B) for different total Jordan Lake allocations 
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(color).  Formulation I solutions are shown in black and include no Jordan Lake allocations (no 
transfers between utilities).  Formulation II solutions are shown in color, corresponding to the 
total Jordan Lake allocations to all four water utilities.   
 
2.3.2  Formulations III and IV: Benefits of Financial Mitigation 
 Although the addition of transfers in Formulation II causes significant improvements in 
reliability, drought management costs, and restriction frequency, many portfolios still display 
high financial risk ( >10% of annual VAR) when plotted in this objective space (Figure 3).  In 
contrast to the drought management costs shown in Figure 2, which represents expected costs, 
financial risk shown in Figure 3 represents the variability of these costs when subject to extreme 
drought.  The only solutions in Formulations I and II with financial risk below this benchmark 
correspond to low-reliability solutions.  These solutions make infrequent use of water use 
restrictions and transfers, leading to lower financial risk but increased risk of reservoir failure.  
Formulations III and IV add contingency funds and third party insurance contracts, respectively, 
as financial tools to mitigate the financial risk shown in high-reliability solutions.  Solution sets 
in both formulations are optimized with respect to this financial risk objective, defined as the 
single-year drought management costs with a 1% probability of being exceeded over a 13-year 
simulation period.  The use of financial mitigation instruments in these formulations allows 
utilities to reduce financial risk without sacrificing water supply reliability.  Portfolios developed 
in Formulation III use contingency funds to mitigate this risk.  Annual contingency fund 
contributions increase expected drought management costs but reduce financial risk as the funds 
are used to offset revenue losses or transfer costs in drought years.  In Figure 3, the effect of 
contingency funds can be seen as the Formulation III (light green) solutions occupy a space that 
includes low financial risk values, even for high reliability solutions.  Formulation II (teal) 
solutions are contained in a portion of this space mostly restricted to high financial risk values, 
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with the exception of low reliability solutions.  Contingency funds used to reduce financial risk 
increase expected drought management costs, introducing a tradeoff between cost expectation 
(drought management costs) and variability (financial risk).  As the drought management costs, 
driven by annual contingency fund contributions, increase, financial risk decreases until the 
contingency fund is maintained at a size large enough to compensate for any drought-related 
revenue losses or transfer costs.  However, utility personnel have consistently pointed out that 
large contingency funds can be difficult to maintain either as a result of bond covenants or 
because unused funds are often appropriated for non-water uses, particularly by cash-strapped 
local governments.  
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Figure 3: Three-dimensional tradeoffs between reliability, drought management costs, and 
financial risk for each of the four problem formulations.  Note that these objectives represent 
regional aggregation where all four water utilities perform at least as well as the regional 
objective solution shown.  The inclusion of financial mitigation in Formulations III and IV 
introduce a tradeoff between financial risk and drought management costs that allow for the 
design of portfolios with high-reliability, low-financial risk solutions. 
 
In an attempt to limit the contingency fund size required to provide high reliability, low 
financial risk portfolios, Formulation IV expands mitigation measures to include combinations of 
both contingency funds and third-party insurance contracts.  The third party contracts provide 
payouts commensurate with drought severity, such that payouts are larger in years with extreme 
conditions and more financial risk.  When used in combination with contingency funds, 
thresholds for contract payouts can be set at levels that are only triggered by extreme droughts, 
keeping the overall contract costs low.  Contingency funds can be used as mitigation in years 
with more moderate drought (and correspondingly lower revenue losses and/or transfer costs) 
that do not trigger contract payouts.  The inclusion of third party insurance contracts facilitated 
the discovery of regional portfolios that simultaneously reduced financial risks and limited 
drought management costs without sacrificing reliability or increasing the frequency of usage 
restrictions. This is observed in Figure 3 as the Formulation IV solution set (red spheres) inhabit 
a space closer to the ideal solution than those in other formulations.  Analyzing the succession of 
Formulations I-IV distinguishes the benefits and tradeoffs of water use restrictions, transfers, and 
financial mitigation tools. 
2.3.3  Constrained Solutions 
 Many potential portfolio solutions included in Figures 2 and 3 fail to meet stated 
performance requirements elicited from utility personnel.  These discussions indicated portfolios 
that provide reliabilities of less than 99% would not be acceptable.  The utilities also expressed 
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the need to limit the frequency with which water use restrictions are implemented, indicating that 
a rate higher than once every five years (20% restriction frequency) would put an undesirable 
burden on consumers.  By applying constraints to these two objective values a posteriori, the 
feasible solution space shrinks considerably (Figure 4).  Portfolios designed in Formulation I 
drop out of the space completely (as indicated by the transparent solutions), meaning that utilities 
need to engage in water transfers if they are to develop drought management plans which meet 
their expressed criteria.  Although some Formulation II solutions remain (teal in Figure 4), none 
can be achieved without financial risk exceeding levels utility managers identify as a significant 
deterrent when evaluating candidate portfolios.   In order to meet the utility managers’ stated 
reliability and restriction frequency objectives while maintaining manageable levels of financial 
risk, portfolios need to be designed with both inter-utility transfers and some degree of financial 
risk mitigation.  Formulation III portfolios, which reduce financial risk through self-insurance 
with contingency funds, and Formulation IV portfolios, which also make use of third-party 
insurance contracts, have the ability to meet managers’ design objectives, although they include 
some increases in expected drought management costs.  However, unlike revenue losses from 
restrictions and transfer costs, the costs associated with contingency funds and third-party 
insurance are constant, making them more attractive from a planning perspective.  It is important 
to note that Formulation IV solutions that include consideration of third-party contracts generally 
dominate the Formulation III contingency fund solutions (i.e., they are better in all objectives).  
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Figure 4: Three dimensional tradeoffs between reliability, drought management costs, and 
financial risks, with solutions that do not meet utility constraints (>99.0% reliability, <20% 
restriction frequency) ‘greyed-out’.  No solutions from Formulation I (blue) meet both 
constraints, and the solutions from Formulation II that do meet the constraints display a high 
level of financial risk.  Opaque solutions from Formulations III and IV display a clear tradeoff 
between financial risk and drought management costs (solutions generally slope from top-left to 
bottom-right).   
 
2.3.4  Individual Solutions 
 Four individual water management portfolios, one from each formulation, are presented 
to further highlight the changes in performance as inter-utility transfers and financial mitigation 
tools are used, represented by the colored lines in Figure 5 (grey solutions represent all other 
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solutions in all four Formulations, as shown in Figure 3).  The four portfolios were selected to 
represent different water management scenarios that provided the exact same reliabilities 
(99.4%).  The portfolio taken from Formulation I (Case 1) only uses restrictions, and must 
employ restriction triggers that are much more conservative (i.e. triggered more frequently) than 
the other three portfolios to achieve the same reliability. In the other three cases, each portfolio is 
constructed with the same mix of transfers and restrictions to achieve a reliability of 99.4%.  The 
remaining differences between portfolios taken from Formulations 2-4 (Cases 2-4) are a result of 
the types of financial mitigation employed (none, contingency fund only, and contingency 
fund/third-party insurance combination, respectively).  In the portfolio taken from Formulation I 
(Case 1), water use restrictions are used in 41.5% of years.  In the subsequent portfolios, taken 
from Formulations II, III, and IV, transfers are also used, reducing the implementation of 
restrictions to 10.7% of years (satisfying utility constraints), while maintaining a reliability of 
99.4%.  In these portfolios, Raleigh is granted a small (2.4%) allocation to Jordan Lake, while 
the other utilities make use of their existing allocations.  The portfolio taken from Formulation II 
(Case 2) is able to reduce expected drought management costs to 0.7% of AVR (down from 
1.8% in Case 1) through the use of transfers.  The utilities buying transfers charge a higher rate 
to their own customers than they are charged by Cary for transfers ($3.00/kgal), so the lost 
revenue from restrictions is higher than the cost of the same volume of transfers, assuming the 
utility’s marginal cost of water provision is very low (Tiger, 2000).  When utilities can replace 
some water use restrictions with transfers, as they do in Case 2, drought management costs 
decrease.  However, financial risk in both Cases 1 and 2 is high (18.0 and 15.8% of AVR, 
respectively). 
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Figure 5: Parallel axis plot of the five performance objectives with expected contingency fund 
size included as a variable of interest for utilities.  One high-reliability solution from each 
problem formulation is selected and shown in color, with the remaining solutions from all 
formulations shown in gray in the background.  Axes are oriented so that the ‘ideal’ objective 
values are placed along the bottom of the plot. 
  
The portfolios from Formulations III and IV (Cases 3 and 4) take advantage of financial 
mitigation tools to reduce this risk.  While the portfolios have the same restriction frequency 
(10.7%) and total Jordan Lake allocations (53%) as Case 2, these tools give utilities flexibility to 
fine-tune their financial objectives.  In Case 3, contingency funds reduce the financial risk from 
15.8% to 9.2%, with only a small increase in expected drought management costs (0.7% to 
1.8%).  For Raleigh, the utility most affected by drought management costs and financial risk, 
nearly all of their drought management costs come from annual contingency fund contributions 
(1.7% of AVR).  The fund is only depleted in years when extreme drought conditions cause 
exceptionally large revenue losses and/or transfer cost increases, exposing the utility to a 1% 
probability of drought management costs reaching 9.2% of AVR.  Because these extreme 
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conditions are rare, Raleigh’s contingency fund has an expected size of 21.5% of AVR 
($40.5MM) at the end of the 16-year simulation and has the potential to be much larger.  Utility 
personnel consistently emphasized the challenges of maintaining such a large contingency fund 
size, particularly in the face of cash-starved municipal budgets.  Combining contingency funds 
with third-party insurance contracts (Case 4) can reduce financial risk (6.4% of AVR) while also 
lowering drought management costs (1.2% of AVR).  For the utility facing the deepest 
challenges, Raleigh, their drought management costs in Case 4 are primarily a result of insurance 
contract costs (1.0% of AVR), with a much smaller share going towards contingency fund 
contributions (0.16% of AVR) (Figure 6).  The utility can maintain a small contingency fund 
(expected to be only 3.4% of total AVR, or $6.4MM, in 2025) for protection against moderate 
droughts, while relying on third party insurance payouts in extreme years.  This approach 
actually reduces drought management costs, despite the estimated 20% risk/return premium on 
the expected value of the insurance contract, because the reduction in contingency funds 
contribution significantly outweighs the additional costs of third party insurance used during 
extreme events. 
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Figure 6: Bar chart showing the makeup of financial risks and mitigation costs for each of the 
four portfolio solutions chosen as ‘cases’ from each formulation.  Expected revenue 
losses/transfer cost increases are shown as the thick blocks above the x-axis, while the constant 
annual mitigation costs, as well as expected contingency fund size, are shown below the x-axis.  
The thin columns above the x-axis represent the revenue losses/transfer costs that have a 1% 
probability of occurring in a single year over the course of the simulations.  The cost of financial 
mitigation used in Cases 3 and 4 is larger than the expected revenue losses/transfer costs in Case 
2, but the 1% risk is reduced significantly. 
 
2.4  Conclusion 
 Relative to the expansion of supply infrastructure, adaptive techniques such as demand 
management and water transfers have the potential to provide improved solutions to water 
resource management challenges. However, more thought must be given to approaches for 
reconciling the resulting tradeoffs between diversification of supply portfolios and financial 
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instability.  Results indicate that the utilities in the Research Triangle can develop high-reliability 
approaches to water management in the short term (2013-2025) without jeopardizing their 
financial stability by employing financial tools alongside water use restrictions and transfers.  In 
fact, results strongly suggest that utilities cannot achieve their stated operational goals without 
introducing unacceptable amounts of financial risk unless those financial tools are a part of their 
water management strategy.  Traditional methods of financial mitigation, such as drought 
surcharges and contingency funds, can leave utility managers politically vulnerable to concerns 
over large price increases or require large fund accumulations to be defended from other 
organizational interests.  A new class of financial mitigation instruments, third-party insurance 
contracts, is shown to provide reductions in financial risk while lowering the expected costs of 
mitigation.  These insights were made possible using a framework of multiple problem 
formulations to identify improvements and tradeoffs involved with portfolio designs of increased 
complexity.  Moreover, the use of many-objective parallel search enabled the rapid discovery of 
high-quality regional water supply portfolios that were able to ‘encourage’ cooperation among a 
number of regional actors.   These results could be of general interest to water managers 
concerned about the financial implications of providing reliable supplies in the face of growing 
populations and dwindling opportunities for the development of traditional, supply-side 
solutions. 
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CHAPTER 3: HOW SHORT TERM PRICING EFFICIENCY DISTORTS LONG-RUN 
UTILITY INCENTIVES 
 
3.1 Introduction 
As a result of increasing development costs and arduous regulatory approval processes 
(Scudder, 2005), the construction of new storage infrastructure has become more challenging 
(Gleick, 2003; Kundzewicz et al., 2007).  Utilities have historically maintained a large portion of 
rarely used supply capacity as insurance against drought, but the increasing costs of further 
supply expansion have led to the exploration of temporary, adaptive alternatives for managing 
scarcity.  Traditionally, the primary response of utilities has been to reduce consumption with 
temporary conservation strategies (e.g. outdoor use restrictions), but in many cases there are also 
opportunities to augment supply via water transfers from other users (Vaux and Howitt, 1984; 
Lund and Israel, 1995; Wilchfort and Lund, 1997; Green and Hamilton, 2000; Jenkins and Lund, 
2000; Jaber and Mohsen, 2001; Calatrava and Garrido, 2005; Zarghami et al., 2007).  Adaptive 
techniques, as opposed to long-term strategies like technology upgrades and public education 
efforts, can be financially destabilizing as they lead to unpredictable and potentially large 
revenue reductions or cost increases (Zeff and Characklis, 2013; Leurig, 2012; Hughes and 
Leurig, 2013).  The contrast is particularly striking when adaptive techniques are compared to 
expensive but financially stable infrastructure-centric strategies that are dominated by relatively 
constant debt service payments.  If, as seems likely, dependence on the construction of new 
storage infrastructure becomes less common in the future (Postel, 2000, Gleick and Palaniappan, 
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2010; Vorosmarty et al., 2000; Falkenmark, 1999), adaptive management approaches will need 
to be designed in ways that limit their financially disruptive effects.   
Many water utilities operate on a cost-recovery basis, setting water prices at levels 
expected to return revenues roughly equal to the large fixed costs that are dominated by debt 
service on infrastructure (Tiger, 2000; Bishop and Weber, 1996).  When determining a pricing 
structure, water utilities often employ a ‘two-part tariff’ (Brown et al., 1992; Griffin, 2001) 
which imposes an inherent tradeoff between the revenue stability provided by fixed fees and the 
conservation signals sent by volumetric rates (Mohayidin et al., 2009).  Recent trends in water 
utility pricing indicate a greater emphasis on volumetric rates (i.e. increasing block tariffs) 
(Tucker et al., 2015), causing revenue shortfalls from periods of reduced consumption to be 
significantly larger than the resulting reductions in costs.  These temporary revenue reductions 
can leave regulated water utilities vulnerable to budgetary shortfalls because changes to 
consumer water rates typically require a lengthy regulatory review (Priest, 1993).  The resulting 
financial instability can have a negative affect on utility credit ratings (Scott et al., 2011), 
increasing debt service payments which can make up a significant portion of overall costs in the 
capital intensive water sector.  This provides utility managers with an incentive to design drought 
response strategies that limit unexpected changes to costs and/or revenues.   
Utilities are also subject to consumer opposition to temporary conservation measures as a 
result of lost surplus from foregone consumption.  Although consumer surplus losses can be 
difficult for utilities to explicitly consider when weighing the costs of conservation policies, 
utilities pursue strategies that implicitly attempt to minimize these losses by (i) targeting ‘low-
value’ water uses with mandated restrictions (i.e. outdoor water use regulations), (ii) 
incentivizing consumption reductions with pre-approved drought surcharges that are 
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implemented under specified conditions of scarcity, or (iii) some combination of the two.  
Drought surcharges provide a more economically efficient means of enacting conservation than 
mandated usage restrictions, resulting in smaller surplus losses from conservation than mandated 
water use restrictions alone (Sibly, 2006; Grafton and Ward, 2008; Krause et al., 2003; Woo, 
1994; Smith and Wang, 2008).  In addition, the relative inelasticity of urban water demands 
mean that surcharges often provide utilities with additional revenue to compensate for lower 
volumetric sales, reducing potential budgetary disruptions.  In the short run, drought surcharges 
can be a beneficial method of encouraging conservation for both consumers and utilities, but 
they do create financial incentives for utilities that could be detrimental to consumers in the long 
run, particularly when alternatives, such as water transfers, are available. 
Water transfers can be advantageous during drought because they can (i) often be 
purchased wholesale for a cost lower than the retail price at which utilities charge their own 
customers, and (ii) offset the need for conservation, eliminating consumers’ surplus losses from 
forgone water use.  Utilities have no way of directly measuring consumer surplus losses during 
drought, and the status quo bias in favor of conservation may make it easier for them to discount 
these losses during drought.  The utility, however, has significant incentives to consider the 
direct financial consequences (i.e. revenue losses from conservation, the costs of transfers) of 
their drought management actions.  If transfers could be purchased at a price lower than the 
revenue losses associated with an equivalent volume of conservation, it could help utilities to 
break from the status quo and consider purchasing transfers as an initial response to drought.  
This effect could be negated when drought surcharges are used to encourage conservation.  The 
additional revenue from higher prices mitigates some or all of the revenue losses from reduced 
consumption, potentially making the cost of transfers larger than revenue losses from equivalent 
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conservation.  Even though customers are also experiencing relative increases in surplus when 
conservation is achieved through drought surcharges instead of mandated restrictions, the 
absolute surplus losses from this conservation can still be much larger than the costs of an 
equivalent volume of transfers.    Transfer agreements, if used at all, could be relegated to an 
‘emergency’ role, with conservation being used more frequently as a drought response.  This 
would lead to unnecessary surplus losses from conservation when transfers are available for a 
fraction of the price.  With less of a financial incentive to avoid enacting conservation, 
surcharges could also retard investment in the infrastructure needed to access auxiliary supplies 
during drought, all to the detriment of consumers. 
This analysis uses pricing and water use data from the Orange Water and Sewer 
Authority (OWASA) to investigate how the use of drought surcharges affects utility revenue, 
consumer surplus related to water consumption, and utility incentives to pursue water transfers.  
The OWASA system serves 80,000 customers in Chapel Hill and Carrboro, North Carolina, and 
has the ability to employ conservation via direct restrictions on use and drought surcharges, as 
well as purchase water transfers.  Currently, OWASA’s Water Shortage Response Plan 
(OWASA, 2010) utilizes conservation, encouraged through a combination of drought surcharges 
and restrictions, in a primary role with transfers relegated to an ‘emergency’ role used only when 
the practical limits of conservation have been achieved.  Using 5 years of individual monthly 
billing records, we develop a model of how drought surcharges interact with mandated 
restrictions at the household level and the resulting revenue implications.  Results illustrate how 
the pursuit of improved efficiency with respect to one policy option (i.e. water conservation 
policies) can skew the incentives to pursue an effective mix of policy alternatives in a regulated 
environment.  
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3.2 The Welfare and Revenue Effects of Rationing by Price and Fiat 
 To understand the effect of drought surcharges on the incentives of utilities and the 
customers they serve, we first consider a simplified example where water use is divided into two 
homogenous classes, ‘indoor’ and ‘outdoor’ (Figure 7), subject to the same constant volumetric 
water price, P1.  The price P1 is set equal to the average cost of water provision (plus a regulated 
rate of return), a situation consistent with standard practice (Brown et al., 1992; Griffin, 2001).  
Because fixed costs dominate utility budgets (Tiger, 2000), it is assumed that the marginal cost 
of treated water production at all relevant consumption levels is zero (chemicals and power, the 
only significant source of volumetric costs, make up only about 5% of total utility costs, with the 
balance being comprised of largely fixed costs for debt service and infrastructure maintenance). 
Different price elasticities of demand are used to represent typical differences between the two 
usage classes (higher elasticity for outdoor uses). In panel A, mandatory water use restrictions of 
the amount ΔQO1 are applied to the outdoor use class (assumed to be allocated efficiently across 
the outdoor uses), leading to a quantity of lost utility revenue (red area), and lost consumer 
surplus (blue area).  The quantitative measures illustrated in figure 7 approximate welfare 
changes as areas under and behind demand curves for water.  The welfare justification for 
consumer surplus is well known (Willig, 1976), and for goods that comprise small budget shares 
for consumers and/or have small income elasticities of demand, changes in consumer surplus are 
close approximations to the more rigorously interpretable willingness to pay and willingness to 
accept measures.  Both budget shares and income elasticities for water are small (Dalhuisen et 
al., 2003), making any approximation error particularly small in this case.  Areas under 
appropriately defined inverse demand curves have the same welfare justification (Madden 1991).    
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Figure 7: Lost utility revenue and consumer surplus resulting (A) from reductions in 
consumption from mandatory restrictions on outdoor use (QO1) and (B) from consumption 
reductions caused by drought surcharges to indoor (QI2) and outdoor (QO2) use. Price is assumed 
to be constant at all consumption levels, equal to the average cost of water provision. 
 
The homogeneity of outdoor water users is a key assumption in Figure 7, one that 
suggests that mandatory outdoor usage restrictions will limit only the least-valued outdoor uses, 
mostly related to lawn irrigation.  This simplification could underestimate the actual consumer 
surplus losses from mandatory restrictions to the extent that outdoor uses are not entirely 
interchangeable. For example, individual consumers may value car-washing more than lawn-
watering or using a swimming pool.  Nonetheless, a more complex conceptual model is used in 
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our empirical application that considers water demand for a larger variety of water uses, partially 
compensating for this understatement. 
In addition to restrictions, conservation can also be achieved through the application of a 
drought surcharge (Figure 7, panel B), ΔP2, resulting in a new water price P+ΔP2, chosen so that 
reductions to both indoor (ΔQI2) and outdoor uses (ΔQO2) sum to be equal to the utility target 
consumption reductions caused by mandatory restrictions (ΔQO1).  Reductions achieved through 
surcharges result in consumer surplus losses (blue areas) in both indoor and outdoor uses, as well 
as utility revenue losses (red areas).  As one would expect, the loss in surplus from drought 
surcharges summed across both user classes is smaller than the lost surplus observed in the case 
of mandated restrictions (Figure 7, panel A), as the same volume of water use reductions is more 
efficiently distributed across the two classes through pricing signals.   
 Assuming relatively inelastic municipal demand, higher prices will generate additional 
revenue when surcharges are used (Figure 8, panel A). This revenue is equivalent to the 
reduction in consumer surplus from the remaining water consumption (purple areas in Figure 8), 
effectively resulting in the transfer of consumer surplus to utility revenues.  Utilities often use a 
combination of drought surcharges and mandated restrictions (Figure 8, panel B) to achieve the 
same targeted level of conservation (ΔQI3 + ΔQO3) as a means of limiting the size of the 
surcharge necessary to achieve this level.  Mandated restrictions reduce the outdoor use by a 
quantity ΔQO3, at which point the new price P+ ΔP3 is applied to both indoor and outdoor use.  
The price increase causes a reduction in indoor water use by a quantity ΔQI3.  The restrictions 
placed on outdoor use are assumed to successfully target the lowest consumer-value outdoor 
uses, and the value of outdoor consumption at the new, restricted levels is higher than the new 
price (P+ΔP3), causing surcharges to have no further effect on outdoor use.   
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Figure 8: Transfer of consumer surplus to utility revenue when consumption reductions are 
caused by (A) surcharges only and (B) surcharges AND mandatory use restrictions. 
This two-instrument policy solves a measurement and transaction cost problem, allowing 
utilities to use restrictions to control lower-valued, easily enforced outdoor use limits and to use 
drought surcharges to reduce the less observable indoor use of water.  When applied to a diverse 
customer base, a fixed reduction in water consumption (Qo-Q1) will result in some magnitude of 
(A) lost consumer surplus, (B) lost utility revenue, and (C) transfer of consumer surplus to utility 
revenue (Figure 9).  The proportions of overall conservation attributed to surcharges and 
mandated restrictions, respectively, have an effect on the size of each region.  The previous 
literature (Sibly, 2006; Grafton and Ward, 2008; Krause et al., 2003; Woo, 1994) focuses on the 
ability of drought surcharges to reduce the surplus or total welfare losses, represented as the  
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Figure 9: Lost consumer surplus from foregone use (A), lost utility revenue (B), and transfer of 
consumer surplus to utility revenue (C) when surcharges and mandatory restrictions are used to 
achieve a given quantity of consumption reduction for a single use type.  
 
sums of reductions to consumer surplus (A) and reductions in revenue from lower consumption 
(B).  Here we additionally consider how surcharges affect utility revenue, represented as the 
difference between revenue reductions from lower consumption (B) and revenue increases from 
higher prices (C).  For a given reduction in consumption (ΔQ) increasing the fraction of 
reduction attributable to surcharges (and subsequently reducing the mandated restrictions) will 
increase the size of C, reducing utility revenue losses, and potentially even turning them into 
revenue gains. 
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3.3 Empirical Measurement 
We implement a welfare measurement model using detailed billing data from the Orange 
Water and Sewer Authority (OWASA) in North Carolina.  Using monthly household billing 
data, we model the response of individual OWASA customers to the imposition of surcharges 
and water use restrictions.  For each bill we determine individual reductions in surplus 
(represented by A+B in Figure 9) and utility revenue (B-C in Figure 9) during periods of 
conservation.  Surplus losses reflect both consumer surplus losses and lost utility revenue.  
Because the marginal cost of treated water production is roughly zero, an approximation of 
welfare change should consider the entire area under the demand between the original (Qo) and 
modified (Q1) consumption levels (i.e. the area A+B in Figure 9).   
To determine individual consumer response to price changes, price elasticities were taken 
from a recent econometric study by Burton and Associates (2007).  This study used regression 
analysis on customers with uninterrupted billing records from 2001-2005 to develop a 
relationship between water demand and price, controlling for a number of weather variables and 
local unemployment (as a stand-in for economic conditions).  The study specified 18 unique 
water demand models to group consumption by residential and non-residential classes, high, 
medium, and low water use, and three distinct meter reading cycles.  In this study, elasticity 
values from each water demand model (Table 5) are used to determine individual consumer 
response to increasing drought surcharges.  The OWASA Water Shortage Supply Plan (2010) 
states that mandatory restrictions apply to all large commercial and industrial users of water as 
well as all irrigation and outdoor residential uses.  For the purposes of this study, we consider 
any commercial or industrial uses of over 12 kgal/month to be subject to water use restrictions.  
Although OWASA does not differentiate between indoor and outdoor residential use for billing 
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purposes, regional use patterns support the assumption the average residential user uses about 
5,000 gallons per month on non-observable, indoor uses.  Any uses above this threshold are 
subject to mandatory restrictions.  The household level consumption data includes a description 
of the type of user associated with each bill, and it is assumed that users billed as multi-family 
residential users (i.e., apartments, dormitories) have minimal outdoor demands and are not 
subject to mandatory use restrictions.  During the study period from 2002-2006, OWASA 
charged its customers a seasonal pricing schedule, with rates increasing during the summer 
irrigation months and decreasing during the non-irrigation month.  This period was bracketed by 
two major droughts during which OWASA implemented periods of temporary conservation, and 
it was during this time that OWASA developed the drought surcharge schedule that was 
employed during the latter drought.  After 2007, OWASA also implemented a tiered-block 
pricing schedule, complicating surplus effects (Hewitt and Hanemann, 1995).  In addition to 
price levels, demand also changes over the course of the year, particularly for irrigation-heavy 
customers, and reductions from surcharges and restrictions are calculated in both January and 
July.  Constant elasticity demand functions are constructed for each consumer group detailed in 
Table 5:      
𝑤𝑖,ℎ = 𝑘𝑖,ℎ ∗ 𝑃𝑖
𝑒𝑔
        (1) 
Where i = month of the year;  
 h = individual household index 
g = consumer group;  
k = constant calculated from household water use data and price history;  
Pi = volumetric water price;  
w= household water consumption (MG); and  
e = consumer price elasticity of demand  
 
The constant k in (1) is calculated using observed consumption from individual billing records 
and historical records of price, with estimates from elasticity based on the consumer groups  
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Consumer Type Use Range (kgal) Elasticity Restrictions 
Low Use Res., Meter Cycle 1 < 4 -0.03 No 
Low Use Res., Meter Cycle 2 < 4 0.0 No 
Low Use Res., Meter Cycle 3 < 4 -0.19 No 
Med. Use Res., Meter Cycle 1 4<x<6 -0.62 Yes 
Med. Use Res., Meter Cycle 2 4<x<6 -0.50 Yes 
Med. Use Res., Meter Cycle 3 4<x<6 -0.61 Yes 
High Use Res., Meter Cycle 1 >6 -1.15 Yes 
High Use Res., Meter Cycle 2 >6 -1.09 Yes 
High Use Res., Meter Cycle 3 >6 -1.24 Yes 
Multi-Family, Meter Cycle 1 All -0.03 No 
Multi-Family, Meter Cycle 2 All 0.0 No 
Multi-Family, Meter Cycle 3 All -0.19 No 
Low Use Comm., Meter Cycle 1 < 12 0.0 No 
Low Use Comm., Meter Cycle 2 < 12 0.0 No 
Low Use Comm., Meter Cycle 3 < 12 0.0 No 
Med. Use Res., Meter Cycle 1 12<x<48 -0.36 Yes 
Med. Use Res., Meter Cycle 2 12<x<48 -0.33 Yes 
Med. Use Res., Meter Cycle 3 12<x<48 -0.60 Yes 
High Use Res., Meter Cycle 1 >48 -0.37 Yes 
High Use Res., Meter Cycle 2 >48 -0.61 Yes 
High Use Res., Meter Cycle 3 >48 -0.38 Yes 
Table 5: Characteristics of user groups during drought 
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outlined in Burton and Associates (2007).  Once k is calculated, changes to individual household 
consumption based on price changes can be estimated. Changes to surplus (A+B) and utility 
revenue (C-B), as represented in Figure 9, are calculated for different combinations of two 
parameters; (i) overall reduction targets and (ii) the percentage of overall reductions attributable 
to drought surcharges.  For example, if the overall reduction target is 15% of consumption (a 
typical drought response level), and 66% of the reductions come from surcharges, then a 
surcharge is calculated that will result in a 10% reduction in overall consumption.  Surcharges 
are applied as a constant multiplicative factor of the volumetric water price, so that a surcharge 
of 25% will result in the volumetric water price increasing by a factor of 1.25.  The surcharge 
level that achieves the desired target is calculated through iteration, converging on the reduction 
targets by solving a modified version of (1) for a surcharge value b, such that 
wi,h
* =
1
i
∑ ∑ ki,h × (b*Pi,h)
eg
hi       (2) 
Where w* = water use after application of surcharges; and  
b = drought surcharge  
 Mandatory use restrictions are then imposed on all applicable consumers as described in 
Table 5.  Reductions are assumed to be uniform across all consumers who are subject to 
mandatory outdoor use restrictions.  Reductions from mandatory restrictions are measured with 
respect to normal (unrestricted) use levels, not surcharge adjusted uses as calculated in (2).  This 
allows the analysis to measure the reductions that would occur under a given level of mandatory 
restrictions without the impact of drought surcharges.  We assume that mandatory restrictions on 
outdoor use are the least-valued uses of water within each household.  Therefore, the combined 
effects of surcharges and restrictions on an individual consumer are not additive, they are 
overlapping (i.e., if surcharges alone cause an individual consumer to reduce consumption by 1 
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kgal and mandatory restrictions cause them to reduce by 2 kgal, all the consumption that would 
have been forgone due to pricing incentives is conserved under mandatory restrictions – or vice 
versa).  For each consumer, their final consumption value is equal to either their consumption 
value when only surcharges are applied or their consumption value when only restrictions are 
applied, whichever is lower.  Note that for some consumers this will be will the surcharge value 
and for others it will be the mandatory restriction value, depending on individual elasticity and 
applicability of restrictions.  The magnitude of mandatory use restrictions are calculated via 
iteration until the total consumption reductions across all consumers (surcharges plus mandatory 
restrictions), reaches the targeted level, such that  
wi,h
** = (1-r) × wi,h        (3) 
subject to  
wi,h
*** =
wi,h
**  if wi,h
** <wi,h
*
wi,h
*  if wi,h
* <wi,h
**
        (4) 
 Where w** = water use after imposition of mandatory restrictions;   
w*** = targeted overall water use during conservation period, and  
r = magnitude of mandatory restrictions  
Once the surcharge level (b) and the reduced total consumption for each consumer (𝑤𝑖,ℎ
∗∗∗) 
is determined, lost utility revenue and consumer surplus can be determined.  These values are 
calculated for each consumer and summed to arrive at a total value: 
LRi = ∑ wi,h × Pi-wi,h
*** × Pi × bh        (5) 
Where LR = lost revenue from reduced consumption; and  
P = volumetric water price 
Finally, 
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LSi = ∑ ∫
w
ki,h
1 εg⁄
dw
wi,h
***
wi,h
h        (6) 
Where LS = lost surplus from reduced use 
3.4 Results  
 The OWASA Water Shortage Response Plan (2010) outlines how conservation targets 
are expected to increase as drought conditions worsen.  These targets are organized into ‘stages’ 
which are triggered using reservoir storage thresholds that vary throughout the year based on 
changing hydrologic and demand patterns.  The revenue and consumer surplus losses from State 
I and II conservation targets are calculated using individual consumption data from 2002 through 
2006.  Conservation targets are larger when outdoor water use is more prevalent, so simulations 
apply reduction targets from each of Stages I and II to a typical month in both the irrigation 
(July) and non-irrigation (January) seasons.  The targets are met through a mixture of surcharges 
and restrictions, and calculations are made so that the effect of gradually replacing mandatory 
use restrictions with drought surcharges can be observed (Figure 10).  Losses are shown per 
thousand gallons (kgal) of conservation, to enable direct comparison between the four reduction 
scenarios considered and the price OWASA is charged for transfers. 
Without the use of drought surcharges, OWASA revenue losses were $5.51/kgal of 
conservation during January and $7.82/kgal during July, equal to the average price per thousand 
gallons paid by consumers during the period 2002-2006.  The total surplus losses, including 
revenue losses and consumer surplus losses, ranged from $6.86/kgal (January, Stage I) to 
$32.36/kgal (July, Stage II).  The average surplus losses per thousand gallons of conservation are 
higher when reductions are higher because more valuable uses of water (providing a larger 
consumer surplus) must be conserved to achieve the higher targets.  Transfers can be acquired 
for $3.00/kgal from a neighboring utility with access to large volumes of excess storage.  When 
 66  
 
mandatory restrictions are the sole means of encouraging conservation, transfers can be used to 
offset the need for some conservation, bringing savings both from the financial perspective of the 
utility (concerned with revenue losses) and from a net welfare perspective.   
When surcharges begin to replace mandated restrictions as the means of achieving 
conservation, revenue losses and surplus losses decrease.  Revenue losses decrease steadily with  
 
Figure 10: Surplus losses and utility revenue losses ($/kgal) compared to transfer costs, as a 
function of the portion of reductions attributable to surcharges.  Red lines show the level of 
consumption reduction OWASA would expect to receive from surcharges alone.  The four 
scenarios shown here represent the irrigation and non-irrigation season reduction targets for 
OWASA’s first two stages of their drought management plans.   
 
the application of drought surcharges and reach zero when surcharges rise to levels that could 
account for between 75 and 87% of the total conservation.  If surcharges increase beyond this 
point, utilities gain revenue during periods of conservation.  Revenue losses (in $/kgal) fall 
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below the cost of water transfers at even lower surcharge levels, reaching $3.00/kgal when 
drought surcharges rise to levels that could account for 40-55% of the total conservation.  Total 
surplus losses also fall when surcharges replace mandated restrictions, and the changes are the 
most pronounced when reduction targets are high.  During Stage I restrictions in January (7% 
reduction target), surplus losses are only 16% smaller when surcharges completely replace 
mandatory restrictions as the means of achieving conservation.  During Stage II restrictions in 
July (30% reduction target), surcharges reduce the size of surplus losses by 70%.  It should be 
noted that surplus losses when mandatory restrictions cause conservation are likely understated 
because it is unlikely that mandatory restrictions exclusively target the lowest-value uses for 
each consumer (e.g. some users may prefer to take shorter showers rather than give up their 
gardens, etc.).  In this way, surcharges may improve conservation outcomes for consumers more 
than the 16-70% reported in this study.  However, surplus losses from conservation remain 2-3 
times as large as the cost of an equivalent volume of transfers, even when surcharges completely 
replace mandatory restrictions during drought. 
3.5 Discussion 
Utilities have the ability to use surcharges to eliminate revenue losses and reduce surplus 
losses from conservation, but even when surcharges are used exclusively, conservation results in 
a significant amount of surplus losses.  These surplus losses are difficult for a water utility to 
directly measure and may not be a large part of the utility’s decision-making process during 
drought, particularly when many of these outdoor uses (e.g. lawn watering, car washing) are 
viewed as unessential or low-value.  Conservation is the traditional response to drought, and 
transfer agreements, when they are available, are often seen as an emergency response after the 
limits of conservation have been reached.  Estimates of consumer’s elasticity and willingness to 
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pay may be viewed as concepts too abstract to incentive changes to the status quo.  Revenue 
losses, on the other hand, are directly measurable by utilities and have the potential to cause 
consequences like credit rating downgrades that reflect directly on utility manager performance.  
These incentives could lead utilities to pursue cheaper alternatives to conservation that, as the 
results of this study show, are clearly beneficial to the consumer.  In the sense that surcharges 
discourage utilities from purchasing transfers in favor of implementing conservation, surcharges 
hurt the consumer, even though the use of surcharges actually improves outcomes once 
conservation is enacted.   
This effect can be observed in the actions of OWASA during the period 2002-2008.  
Since the construction of a new reservoir in 1990, OWASA had enjoyed relative water 
abundance, and neither conservation nor transfer agreements were needed during the period 
1990-2002 (after imposing water use restrictions 6 separate times during the 1980’s).  In 2002, 
the combination of population growth and a particularly extreme drought caused the utility to 
enact water use restrictions that lasted four months in the late summer.  The reduced 
consumption observed during the drought initiated budgetary shortfalls that ultimately led to a 
credit rating downgrade in 2006.  Instead of pursuing agreements with neighboring utilities to 
secure transfers that were available from nearby (and underutilized) Jordan Lake, OWASA 
implemented a schedule of drought surcharges.    The drought surcharges were set at levels 
corresponding to the red lines in Figure 10.  Even though these surcharges significantly reduced 
the overall surplus losses from future conservation, they also removed any financial benefit the 
utility would have realized by offsetting conservation with transfers.  When another drought 
occurred in 2007-08, OWASA spent 8 months under conservation but did not purchase any 
water transfers, despite their availability through interconnections with neighboring utilities.  The 
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revenue losses from conservation were minimal (in fact OWASA received a credit rating 
upgrade two years after the end of the drought), but consumers were forced to bear the burden of 
eight months of conservation.  Even now, OWASA’s water shortage response plan dictates that 
transfers will not be purchased until the utility is already under conservation, even though they 
are still available for purchase for a price far less than OWASA charges its retail customers.   
This effect also has the potential to retard investment in infrastructure that could be used 
to expand the capacity to engage in transfers, such as the network of conveyance pipelines 
OWASA uses to access larger regional water sources.  The capacity of these pipelines constrains 
the rate at which neighboring supplies can be used as transfer sources, and upgrading them 
would entail significant costs.  The benefits (avoiding surplus losses from conservation) derived 
from these measures could very well outweigh their upfront costs, but utilities typically do not 
have a reliable way to measure losses beyond what they experience in revenue losses.  Financial 
incentives to avoid implementation of conservation therefore come largely from potential lost 
revenues, and the use of surcharges greatly reduces these incentives.  This analysis is not meant 
to suggest that drought surcharges have no place in drought management plans.  It is well 
established that surcharges can increase surplus when compared to mandatory restrictions (Smith 
Jr. and Wang, 2008; Sibly, 2006; Grafton and Ward, 2008; Krause et al., 2003; Woo, 1994), and 
these results also show significant increases in surplus, particularly when conservation targets are 
large.  However, when utilities are unable to more fully incorporate consideration of surplus 
losses from conservation, budgetary pressures could cause utilities to undervalue potential 
alternatives, particularly when drought surcharges significantly reduce the revenue losses from 
conservation.  Awareness of this fact, both among utility managers and the general public, could 
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lead to the exploration and investment in alternatives that benefit consumers by reducing the 
need for periodic conservation in the face of drought. 
3.6 Conclusion 
 The increasing financial and environmental burden of constructing new water supply 
sources has led utilities to place a greater importance on adaptive techniques like conservation or 
water transfers to manage drought.  The unpredictability of the resulting financial implications 
(lost revenue, additional costs) can be difficult to manage, giving utility managers an incentive to 
develop plans that combine their use in a way that minimizes potential budgetary disruptions.  
Drought surcharges present utilities with a particularly compelling solution to this problem.  In 
addition to mitigating some or all of these revenue losses, the pricing signals sent to consumers 
allow conservation to be distributed more efficiently than with simple restrictions on water use 
(i.e. residential irrigation mandates).  However, drought surcharges may also lead to unintended 
consequences, particularly when alternatives to conservation, such as water transfers, are 
available. Although conservation is viewed by utilities as a ‘more conventional’ response to 
drought, particularly in the Eastern United States, alternatives that can be obtained at less cost 
could provide an incentive to break with the status quo.  Drought surcharges effectively make 
revenue losses from conservation ‘cheaper’ than the cost of alternatives, even as the surplus 
losses from conservation remain significantly higher.  In the case of OWASA, when surcharges 
account for 40-55% of the total conservation, revenue losses fall below the cost of purchasing 
transfers from neighboring utilities ($3.00/kgal), even as surplus losses remain 2-3 times higher 
than these prices.  Without a direct way of measuring their consumers’ surplus losses from 
conservation, the status quo bias in favor of conservation may make it easier to discount these 
losses.  Transfer agreements, if used at all, could be relegated to an ‘emergency’ role, with 
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conservation being used more frequently as a drought response.  This would lead to unnecessary 
welfare losses from conservation when transfers could be available for a fraction of the price.  
With less of a financial incentive to avoid enacting conservation, surcharges could also retard 
investment in the infrastructure needed to access auxiliary supplies during drought, all to the 
detriment of consumers.  These results illustrate how the pursuit of efficiency with respect to one 
policy option (i.e. conservation) can alter the incentives to integrate that policy with a wider 
range of potentially beneficial alternatives. 
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CHAPTER 4: INTEGRATING INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT, 
CONSERVATION, AND WATER TRANSFERS INTO ADAPTIVE POLICY 
PATHWAYS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Many communities worldwide are being driven to diversify their water management 
strategies due to the increasing costs and regulatory burden of traditional supply-side 
development.  Recent studies have recognized the need for water management strategies that 
incorporate a broader range of demand-side options to reduce reliance on new supplies, 
especially for systems where large portions of their storage are primarily used as a hedge against 
drought (Gleick, 2003; Kundzewicz et al., 2007; Postel, 2000).  Systems that incorporate 
adaptive, short term water management measures like temporary conservation or water transfers 
typically reduce the long-term average cost of their meeting reliability goals and provide a more 
robust approach to managing supply risk (Kirsch et al., 2009; Kaspryzk et al., 2009; Kidson et 
al., 2013; Herman et al., 2014).   However, the intermittent and uncertain use of adaptive 
measures can introduce financial instability through reduced revenues (fewer water sales) and 
increased costs (increased transfer purchases) that can be difficult to manage for price-regulated 
water utilities (Leurig, 2010; Hughes and Leurig, 2013).  In response, strategies involving 
financial instruments (e.g. index insurance) have been developed to allow utilities to take full 
advantage of adaptive measures by substantially reducing the risk of incurring financial 
instability (Zeff and Characklis, 2013; Zeff et al., 2014).  Adaptive measures can, however, face 
other limitations (e.g. willingness to impose conservation methods, capacities of transfer 
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infrastructure) and new infrastructure can be necessary in the face of growing water demand.   
As adaptive measures are more frequently integrated into long-term infrastructure plans, the 
inter-dependent questions of when, what, and how much to build infrastructure are even more 
complex than has historically been the case.  Methods for sequencing long-term infrastructure 
have historically neglected the impacts of short-term management decisions (Loucks et al., 
2005).  Current methods aim attempt to provide a dynamic response to uncertainty by updating 
long-term infrastructure plans at periodic intervals, but do not provide a mechanism to account 
for dynamic short-term operational responses to changing drought conditions (Beh et al., 2015; 
Kwadijk et al., 2010; Haasnoot et al., 2012; Kwakkel et al., 2012).  This study contributes a 
formal framework for using risk-based triggers designed to work across multiple timescales and 
integrate long-term planning and short-term management decisions.  The short-term management 
decisions are embedded within the long-term planning pathways, creating dynamic coordination 
as decisions are updated in response to changing information.  This link between short- and long-
term actions becomes more complex with the consideration of multiple decision-makers that are 
connected through shared infrastructure.  The flexibility of this framework can be used to clarify 
the impacts individual decisions have on regional objectives and to evaluate the benefits of 
coordinated decision-making in the short- and long-term. 
Predicting long term regional demands and resource constraints remains a fundamental 
challenge that has motivated a growing number of water infrastructure sequencing approaches 
(Ray et al., 2012; Housh et al., 2013; Kang and Lansey, 2014).  Many of these provide ‘static’ 
robustness to deep uncertainty, attempting to sequence infrastructure decisions in a way that 
meets design criteria across a number of potential scenarios.  However, development plans can 
also exhibit ‘dynamic’ robustness, where decision paths are periodically updated as new 
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information about deeply uncertain variables is observed (Walker et al., 2013).  A key 
component of these strategies is the use of ‘triggers’ that tie decisions to performance metrics 
capable of responding to changing conditions (Walker et al., 2001; Kwakkel et al., 2010; 
Haasnoot et al., 2013).  Infrastructure planning processes that include formal mechanisms for 
adaptation over time have been shown to perform better than those that achieve robustness 
through static means (Beh et al., 2015) and have enabled a number of water systems to design 
more robust plans for developing in the face of ‘deep’ uncertainty (Groves et al., 2014; 
Rosenzwig et al., 2011; Delta Programme, 2012).  Integrating portfolios of short-term 
management measures with adaptive infrastructure pathways provides utilities even greater 
flexibility with respect to deep uncertainty, but this integration presents a number of difficulties.  
In the past, management actions have often been evaluated either as entirely non-structural 
decisions (Lund and Israel, 1995; Zarghami, 2010), or in conjunction with infrastructure 
decisions that are made irrespective of sequencing (Wilchfort and Lund, 1997; Jenkins et al., 
2004).  Other studies have treated management actions as permanent measures to be 
deterministically optimized alongside infrastructure options (Rosenberg et al., 2008; Padula et 
al., 2013).  Traditional optimization methods (linear and stochastic programming) used to 
develop these management strategies can have difficulty integrating with multiple independent 
development pathways governed by nonlinear triggers which may often be more appropriate.  If 
a utility’s ability to adapt in the short-term using conservation and transfers does not reflect long-
term adaptations to changing conditions, the degree to which they can augment traditional supply 
infrastructure will not be properly reflected within a model. 
As an alternative, risk-based rules can be used to govern the implementation of adaptive 
strategies, such as in the design of transfer agreements (Characklis et al., 2006; Palmer and 
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Characklis, 2008; Kasprzyk et al., 2009).  Instead of optimizing the exact timing of management 
actions, optimization occurs relative to the rules that govern those actions.  These rules can be 
designed to incorporate new information about storage potential, demand changes, and 
streamflow observations, allowing them to trigger management options or infrastructure changes 
in response to a system’s evolving dynamics.  The resulting integrated policy pathways display 
coordination between the use of short-term management actions (conservation and transfers) and 
the sequenced selection of infrastructure.  This study uses integrated planning pathways that 
coordinate conservation, transfers, and infrastructure development to evaluate the benefits from 
cooperation among four water utilities in the Research Triangle region of North Carolina.  
Results suggest that cooperation via both transfers and collective investment in jointly owned 
infrastructure can provide significant advantages over a more traditional scenario in which 
utilities plan and operate independently. 
4.2 Methods 
This work builds on the dynamic adaptive policy pathway framework proposed by 
Haasnoot et al. (2013) to develop integrated water management portfolios that include new 
supply infrastructure, conservation, and water transfers in a multi-stakeholder environment.  
Building on the risk-based rules developed to govern inter-utility water transfers in the previous 
work by Palmer and Characklis (2008), both long- and short-term risk measures serve as 
decision rules within the integrated water supply portfolio pathways.  These metrics describe a 
utility’s ‘risk-of-failure’, which is a function of storage conditions, demand, and the historical 
streamflow record (described in detail in section 2.1.3).  During the course of the simulation, 
new streamflow ‘observations’ are appended to the historical record, demand projections are 
updated, and capacities change as a result of dynamically triggered infrastructure decisions.  As 
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these changes are reflected in the risk metrics, model decisions have a formal mechanism for 
adaptation in both the short- and long-term, more accurately representing the way in which a 
utility’s decision-making process would evolve over time.  Although model decisions may differ 
depending on the conditions experienced within a specific simulation, the rules that govern these 
decisions are evaluated with respect to an ensemble of streamflow records.  Objectives relating 
to short-term operational decisions (conservation, transfers) and long-term planning decisions 
(infrastructure construction), elicited through communication with utility managers, are 
calculated from the results of this ensemble of simulations.  In this study, three problem 
formulations are evaluated to illustrate how a region’s water supply can benefit from the use of 
cooperative management actions and shared regional infrastructure.  The formulations are 
designed to progressively increase in complexity as the potential for cooperation is added to 
pathway decisions.  Building on the work of Kasprzyk et al. (2009), each formulation serves as a 
subset of the more complex formulation, allowing for a direct consideration of the effects of 
cooperation on potential policy pathways. 
4.2.1 The Research Triangle Water Supply Model 
4.2.1.1 Water Supply Infrastructure in the Research Triangle 
The Regional Water Supply model (model) includes all existing storage, treatment, and 
conveyance infrastructure used by the four primary water utilities in the Research Triangle, 
including Raleigh, Durham, Cary, and OWASA, as well as the capacity to incorporate potential 
new supply options (Figure 11) as outlined in the Triangle Regional Water Supply Plan (TJCOG, 
2012).  The independent water supply systems of Raleigh, Durham, Cary, and OWASA currently 
consist of nine surface water reservoirs across the Cape Fear and Neuse River basins.   The 
primary water supply source for Cary, Jordan Lake, is operated by the Army Corps of Engineers, 
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Figure 11:  Map of the Research Triangle study area, showing service areas for Raleigh, 
Durham, Cary, and OWASA; nine surface water reservoirs; six water treatment plants, and 
regional interconnections between water distribution systems 
 
which has allocated a portion of the reservoir for municipal water supply.  Cary has access to 
35.5% of that allocation and operates the only intake on the reservoir.  The remaining portion of 
the Jordan Lake water supply allotment is a substantial volume of water that could serve as a 
source of water transfers for other municipalities in the region, particularly during drought 
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periods when other regional sources become stressed.  In order for municipalities other than Cary 
to gain access to this water, it must be withdrawn and treated at the Cary water treatment plant 
(WTP), then transferred via a network of ‘interconnections’ (i.e. pipelines), a service for which 
Cary charges a fee of $3.00/kgal.  Transfers of Jordan Lake allocations via the Cary WTP are 
subject to capacity constraints at the treatment plant and within the interconnection network.  For 
more detailed description of the current regional supply infrastructure in the Triangle, see Zeff et 
al. (2014). 
Potential new supply projects range from new storage construction, the expansion of 
existing storage sites, the development of quarries into offline storage, run-of-river intakes, 
operational changes to federally administered reservoirs, and direct reuse systems (Table 6).  
Throughout the model simulations, utilities will be able to augment their infrastructure 
development with adaptive drought management methods like temporary conservation and water 
transfers from Jordan Lake.  In addition to the Cary WTP, utilities also have the potential to 
increase their access to Jordan Lake via the construction of a new WTP and intake.  The WTP 
would be located on the western shore of Jordan Lake, with direct access to Durham and 
OWASA.  Raleigh could access the treatment plant through interconnections with Durham.  
Utilities have the option to cooperatively develop this infrastructure option, with each utility 
gaining access to the WTP capacity in proportion to its share of the financing. 
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Infrastructure option Utility Cost 
($MM) 
Storage 
/Production 
Permitting 
period end date 
University Lake exp. OWASA 107 2550 MG 2027 
Cane Creek Reservoir exp. OWASA 127 3000 MG 2027 
Stone Quarry shallow exp. OWASA 1.4 1500 MG 2033 
Stone Quarry deep exp. OWASA 64.6 2200 MG 2033 
Teer Quarry exp. Durham 22.6 1315 MG 2017 
Reclaimed water (low) Durham 27.5 2.2 MGD 2017 
Reclaimed water (high)  Durham 104.4 11.3 MGD 2027 
Lake Michie exp. (low) Durham 158.3 2500 MG 2027 
Lake Michie exp. (high) Durham 203.3 7700 MG 2027 
Little River Reservoir Raleigh 263 3700 MG 2027 
Richland Creek Quarry Intake Raleigh 400 4000 MG/ 50 
MGD intake 
2027 
Falls Lake WQ Pool Reallocation Raleigh 68.2 4100 MGD 2027 
Neuse River Intake Raleigh 225.5 16 MGD 2027 
Western Jordan WTP (init) Regional 243.3 33 MGD 2022 
Western Jordan WTP (exp) Regional 73.5 54 MGD 2037 
 
Table 6: Potential new infrastructure options in the Research Triangle 
 
4.2.1.2 Streamflow and Demand Projections 
The model uses a Monte Carlo approach to simulate storage in regional reservoirs at a 
weekly timestep.  Synthetic streamflow records are generated at seven streamflow gauge sites 
within the Neuse and Cape Fear River basins to simulate natural inflow gains to regional 
reservoirs, as well as at three additional gauge sites that simulate downstream flows used to 
regulate environmental releases from reservoirs.  Synthetic streamflow records are generated 
through a modified ‘Fractional Gaussian Noise’ (mFGN) method that recreates seasonal patterns 
observed in the statistical moments (mean and standard deviation) and autocorrelation of the 78-
year historical records at each gauge site (Kirsch et al., 2013).  This approach differs from many 
standard autoregressive models in that it allows cyclical changes to the correlation at each time 
lag, allowing for the effects of seasonal patterns in infiltration and evapotranspiration on the 
rainfall/runoff relationship to affect the modeled autocorrelation.  In particular, this effect plays 
an important role in capturing the streamflow dynamics during extreme hydrologic events, like 
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drought, which are of critical importance to evaluating water supply risk.  Synthetic natural 
inflow gains are augmented by controlled flows from upstream reservoir releases and wastewater 
returns that are calculated within the model.  Controlled flows are removed from the historical 
record used to generate synthetic flows, creating a synthetic record of natural inflow gains along 
a portion of the river estimated by a given streamflow gauge.  Reservoir releases are determined 
based on the season and downstream flow conditions, as required through agreements with 
downstream users and environmental regulations.  Wastewater returns are determined by weekly 
municipal water demands and the individual plant recovery factor, as determined from historical 
observations (NCDENR and Hydrologics, 2009).  Synthetic evaporation fluxes at the reservoir 
surface are generated per unit surface area using the same synthetic generation techniques that 
are used for streamflow. 
Municipal water demands at each reservoir complete the regional water balance.  
Demands for each utility are based on annual growth estimations and seasonal trends.  Annual 
growth predictions are provided by utilities based on future projections of development and 
population growth.  Weekly multipliers are calculated from historical data and applied to 
predicted average annual demand to recreate seasonal trends.  Weekly variations from these 
trends are also derived from the historical record, where a joint probability density function is 
used to develop a distribution of demand variations (standard deviations from the mean weekly 
multiplier) conditioned on streamflow conditions for each utility.  The variations are then 
randomly sampled from this weekly distribution and applied to the multiplier-adjusted weekly 
demand.  Individual utilities that use more than one water supply source must then determine 
how to tap each source to meet this weekly demand.  Sources with no storage (i.e. run-of-river 
intakes, direct reuse) are used to the maximum possible levels given their engineering and 
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environmental constraints (Table 6).  The remaining sources are used in proportion to their 
current storage volumes, also subject to treatment and conveyance constraints listed in Table 6.   
Uncertainty in the model is derived from the ensemble of synthetic streamflow records 
used in the Monte Carlo analysis as well as the correlated sampling of weekly demand 
uncertainty in the historical record.  Results reflect an ensemble of 1000 unique 45-year 
streamflow records that are used to simulate inflows in the region during the planning period, 
2015-2060.  Each synthetic record samples from the statistical distributions observed in the 
historical streamflow records.  Combined with the deterministic demand growth projections, the 
modeling goal for this study is to provide a quiantitative baseline scenario for the region’s water 
supply that assumes hydrologic stationarity, as well as the deterministic demand pojections 
currently being used to inform regional planning efforts through 2060.  While this is not the only, 
nor even most likely future scenario, it was chosen to (a) link directly to current regional 
planning by the Triangle J Council of Governments (TJCOG, 2012); (b) provide a rigorous 
quantitative baseline of the tradeoffs inherent to the region’s current plans and operating policies; 
(c) transition from static pre-defined infrastructure roadmaps to dynamically adaptive integrated 
infrastructure and management pathways and (d) clarify the benefit of a cooperative, integrated 
plan for the development and management of regional water supply infrastructure; even under 
what can be considered favorable assumptions about the future hydrologic and population 
conditions.  The optimistic baseline results explored in this study will be explored critically to 
evaluate the costs and consequences of a much broader envelope of deeply uncertain risk factors 
in future work (i.e., climate change, uncertain demand growth rates, uncertainties in conservation 
responses, uncertainties in the cost and construction timelines of new capacities, etc.). 
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4.2.1.3 Risk-of-failure triggers 
 Model decisions are triggered using two related risk-of-failure (ROF) metrics as 
developed in Palmer and Characklis (2008).  New infrastructure construction is regulated with a 
long term ROF metric that measures the probability of total reservoir storage dropping below 
20% of total capacity at any point during the subsequent 78 weeks.  These calculations are made 
once per year, and when long-term ROF exceeds a utility-specific long-term ROF ‘threshold’, 
new infrastructure construction is triggered.  After a construction period that varies randomly 
over a uniform distribution of 3-5 years (reflecting uncertainty in the construction process), the 
new infrastructure capacity is incorporated into the overall water balance model.  Water demands 
used to calculate long-term ROF are assumed to be the current demand plus a ‘demand buffer’ 
used  to account for the need to plan infrastructure for the future because of the lag between 
construction and operation.   Long term ROF calculations are made assuming that reservoirs 
begin at full capacity to measure the water supply risk independent of current drought conditions.  
Adaptive drought measures (temporary conservation, transfers), on the other hand, are triggered 
with a short-term ROF metric, measured as the probability that total reservoir storage will drop 
below 20% of total capacity at any point during the subsequent 52 weeks under projected 
demand levels.  Short term ROF calculations are made in each week starting with reservoirs at 
their current capacity to reflect a real-time measure of water supply risk given the current 
drought conditions. 
 Risk-of-failure metrics adapt to changing conditions by incorporating new information 
into risk calculations over the course of simulations.  Probability calculations are made by 
breaking the streamflow record into discrete blocks that begin during the current simulation 
week of each year on record and include the subsequent 78 weeks (for long term ROF 
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calculations) or 52 weeks (short term) of streamflow observations.  As model time progresses, 
synthetic streamflows realized during the course of the simulation are appended to the historic 
streamflow record, and the synthetic streamflow realizations are incorporated into ROF 
calculations.  Calculations are limited to a 50-year moving window encompassing the most 
recent 50 years of historical and/or synthetic data to limit their computational intensity.  This 
study assumes a stationary environment, but in a non-stationary hydrologic environment this 
moving window may be more appropriate because recent observations will be more indicative of 
future streamflow than older observations.  In addition, ROF calculations also incorporate new 
supplies and/or reduced effective demand (resulting from non-storage based infrastructure, like 
water reuse systems) that result from model decisions over time.  Long term ROF calculations 
incorporate new infrastructure as soon as they are triggered (before the end of the construction 
period), so that future infrastructure decisions reflect all development in progress.  Short term 
ROF, however, does not incorporate new infrastructure until the end of the construction period, 
when the infrastructure will be available to meet demands (Figure 2).  Thus, long term 
infrastructure decisions can have an effect on the triggers used to make both long- and short- 
term decisions in the future. 
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Figure 12: Relationship between long-term infrastructure planning and short-term utility 
operations. Projected ROF reaches new infrastructure trigger, increasing storage and causing a 
long-term downward shift in the weekly ROF measurements, in turn reducing utility reliabce on 
restriction and transfers 
 
4.2.2 Problem Formulation 
Integrated policy pathways are designed to explore the infrastructure development, 
drought management, and financial decision variables (Table 7) that balance tradeoffs between 
six regional utility objectives (Table 8).  This work develops sets of potential regional pathways 
under three distinct problem formulations, each of which adds policy options that enable 
progressively more cooperation between the utilities.   
4.2.2.1 Decision Variables 
The decision variables in each formulation define the infrastructure options, drought 
management methods, and financial mitigation tools that comprise each utility’s integrated 
policy pathways.   These decision variables are used to calculate six objective values, such that: 
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𝐹(𝑥) =  𝑓𝑅𝐸𝐿 , 𝑓𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑄 , 𝑓𝑁𝑃𝐶  , 𝑓𝐽𝐿𝐴, 𝑓𝑃𝐹𝐶 , 𝑓𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 
    𝑥 = (𝑅𝑖, 𝑇𝑖, 𝐷𝑖 , 𝑂𝑖, 𝐴𝑖, 𝐶𝑖, 𝐼𝑇𝑖 𝐼𝑃𝑖 , 𝐹𝑖)    (1) 
Where fREL = utility supply reliability; fRESFREQ = utility restriction frequency; fNPC = utility net 
present cost of infrastructure investment; fJLA = utility Jordan Lake allocation; fPFC = utility peak 
financing cost; fRISK = utility financial risk (drought management costs, less mitigation, in highest 
1% of model simulations); i = utility index, (i = 1, 2, 3, 4); R = short-term ROF thresholds for 
conservation; T = short-term ROF thresholds for water transfer requests from Cary WTP; D = 
long-term ROF thresholds for new infrastructure development; O = rank order of individual 
utility infrastructure options; A = Jordan Lake allocation (% of available capacity); C = annual 
contingency fund contribution ($); IT = short-term ROF thresholds for insurance payments; IP = 
weekly payout for third party insurance ($); and F = fraction ownership of shared regional water 
treatment plant.  
Water use restrictions (conservation) and transfer requests from Jordan Lake via Cary are 
both triggered when short term ROF rises above the respective thresholds set for each individual 
utility.  When restrictions are triggered, water consumption is reduced below natural demand 
levels.  The magnitude of reductions increase as drought conditions worsen, and the total 
reductions are assumed to be the deterministic values outlined by each utility in their ‘Water 
Shortage Response Plans’ published online (Orange Water and Sewer Authority, 2010; Goodwin 
and Cefalo, 2010; Westbrook et al., 2009; City of Raleigh, 2010).  When a utility’s short term 
ROF exceeds the transfer threshold, transfers are requested from the Cary WTP.  These requests 
are constrained by regional capacity constraints and the purchasing utility’s remaining Jordan 
Lake allocation, as outlined in Zeff et al. (2014).   
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Decision Description Formulation Range 
Water use 
restriction 
threshold 
Short-term ROF used to trigger water 
use restrictions 
I, II, and III 0-100% (ROF) 
Water transfer 
threshold 
Short-term ROF used to trigger water 
transfers from the Cary WTP 
II and III 0-100% (ROF) 
Infrastructure 
development 
threshold 
Long-term ROF used to trigger 
construction of a new infrastructure  
I, II, and III 0-100% (ROF) 
Infrastructure 
order 
Rank-order of infrastructure options 
to determine their sequence when 
triggered 
I, II, and III 1, 2, …., n  
Jordan Lake 
allocation 
Percentage of Jordan Lake storage 
reserved for individual utility 
II and III 50.5 – 100% 
Contingency fund 
contribution 
Annual amount of money put aside 
by utility for ‘self-insurance’ from 
revenue shortfalls and transfer costs 
I, II, and III 0-10 (% of total 
annual volumetric 
revenue) 
Insurance payment 
thresholds 
ROF triggers used to determine when 
insurance payouts occur 
I, II, and III 0-100% (ROF) 
Weekly insurance 
payouts 
Weekly payouts from insurance 
contracts in weeks when thresholds 
are reached 
I, II, and III 0-1 (% of total 
annual volumetric 
revenue) 
Ownership share 
of Western Jordan 
WTP 
The proportion of the Western Jordan 
WTP owned by an individual utility 
(determines payment and usage) 
III 0-100% 
 
Table 7: Decision variables  
 
Utility water prices are typically set at levels to cover their costs, which are mostly fixed 
payments for debt service on infrastructure investment.  Regulated utilities cannot quickly 
change these prices in response to reduced revenue from conservation or unplanned costs from 
transfers, and the resulting financial disruption can be difficult for utilities to manage, 
particularly during extreme drought when these swings can grow quite large.  Utilities can 
mitigate the resulting financial impact through a combination of self-insurance (i.e. contingency 
funds) or third-party index insurance contracts (Zeff and Characklis, 2013; Zeff et al, 2014).  
Contingency funds use a constant annual payment to build a ‘buffer’ that can be drawn upon in 
years where restrictions cause revenue shortfalls or transfers create additional, unplanned costs.  
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Third party index insurance provides utilities with payouts under certain hydrologic conditions 
that correlate with the use of restrictions and transfers.  In exchange for this payout, utilities pay 
an annual fee equal to the expected payouts plus a ‘loading’ of 30%, which accounts for the 
insurer’s return on investment, risk premium, and administration costs.  Using a combination of 
self- and third-party insurance allows utilities to minimize the annual costs of reducing harmful 
swings in revenue and cost down to an ‘acceptable’ level (Zeff and Characklis, 2013; Zeff et al., 
2014).  These mitigation schemes can be defined using three decision variables for each utility, 
the annual contribution to a contingency fund (as a % of the utility’s total annual revenue), ROF 
thresholds used to trigger weekly insurance payouts, and the size of those payouts (as a % of the 
utility’s total annual revenue).  Contingency fund payments are made at the beginning of each 
year, and any unused balance in a contingency fund at the end of the year carries over to the next 
year while accruing a 5% annual return.  Insurance payouts are paid directly into the contingency 
fund during the week in which insurance ROF thresholds are triggered.   
New infrastructure construction for each utility is triggered through independent long-
term ROF thresholds.  Each utility has a number of infrastructure options, and each option has an 
individual ranking.  When a utility’s long-term ROF threshold is exceeded, the model ‘chooses’ 
the highest-ranked infrastructure option, provided that the ‘permitting’ period for the option has 
ended.  Each infrastructure option has pre-construction permitting processes that require limited 
financial investment but effectively set the earliest date that construction could begin on a 
project. These processes are currently ongoing for all the projects that utilities have identified as 
potential options, but regulatory hurdles will cause some to take many years and may limit when 
some projects can be started.  If an infrastructure option is picked to begin construction but its  
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Figure 13: New development triggered by long-term ROF threshold.  Once threshold is 
reached, a construction period begins, after which the development pathway moves to a new 
infrastructure state (expansion of Lake Michie - large) 
 
permitting period has not ended, the next-highest ranked option is chosen and the original choice 
returns to the top of the list of future potential projects.  Once an infrastructure option has been 
picked, a construction period begins.  The construction period lasts for 3-5 years, determined 
randomly at the start of construction.  After the construction period, the new infrastructure 
capacity is incorporated into the simulation.  This process can be visualized as a jump to a new 
development pathway (Figure 13).  The additional capacity causes the long-term ROF to drop.  If 
growing demands cause the long-term ROF to rises over time and exceed the long-term ROF 
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threshold again, this process is repeated with the remaining infrastructure options.  In the ‘no 
cooperation’ and ‘weak cooperation’ problem formulation, utilities make these movements 
independent of one another (Figure 14A).  In the problem formulation that includes shared 
infrastructure, the regional water treatment plant is included in the list of infrastructure options 
with each utility ranking this option independently.  Construction begins on the shared water 
treatment plant as soon as it is triggered by any utility (if the permitting period has ended).  Even 
though the infrastructure option is only triggered by one utility, all participating utilities pay for 
their portion and make a coordinated movement along a joint development pathway (Figure 
14B).  Once the shared infrastructure option is triggered by one utility, it is removed from the list 
of potential options for all other utilities, as it is already in use. 
 
Figure 14: Example infrastructure development pathways for Durham and Raleigh, without 
utility cooperation on infrastructure development (A) and with utility cooperation on 
infrastructure development (B) 
 
4.2.2.2 Objective Functions 
Each objective function is calculated as the result of 1000 unique 46 year (2015-2060) 
simulations.  Three problem formulations are evaluated with respect to six objectives, supply 
reliability (fREL), restriction frequency (fRESFREQ), net present costs of infrastructure investment 
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costs (fNPC), total Jordan Lake allocation (fJLA), peak annual financing costs (fPFC), and financial 
risk (fRISK).  The objectives are initially calculated for each individual utility, but the 24 total 
objectives would constitute an optimization problem that exceeds both the capabilities of current 
Pareto-ranking based optimization tools (Teytaud, 2006) and the cognitive limits of decision 
makers (Miller, 1956).  In an attempt to reduce the dimensionality of the problem, the objectives 
are reformulated as regional objectives.  For the objectives measuring total Jordan Lake 
allocation (fJLA) and net present cost of infrastructure investment (fNPC), it is appropriate to sum 
individual utilities objective values to reach a regional objective.  However, for the remaining 
objectives, the regional objective is determined to be the value of the worst-performing utility 
with respect to that single objective, guaranteeing that all utilities attain an individual objective 
value equal to or better than the regional objective value, as in Zeff et al. (2013).  The regional 
objectives reduce the dimension of the multi-stakeholder planning problem while guaranteeing 
that individual utility solutions converge toward optimally idenfitied objectives (Woodruff et al., 
2013).  These objectives have been developed with input from utility personnel, who also 
provided a set of constraints on three of the objectives that create ‘acceptability bounds’ on 
potential solutions.  The utility defined constraints include (i) supply reliability > 99%, (ii) 
restriction frequency < 20%, and (iii) financial risk < 10% of total volumetric revenue. 
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Objectives Description Purpose ε-value 
Reliability Probability that reservoir storage will 
not drop below 20% of capacity in the 
worst performing 12 month period 
during 1000 unique simulations over 
the period 2015-2060 
A measure of a policy 
pathway’s ability to meet 
water demand under 
drought conditions 
.001 (%) 
Restriction 
frequency 
The expected percentage of years over 
the course of the simulation (2015-
2060) when at least 1 week of water 
use restrictions has been enacted 
Utility managers have 
noted that frequent 
implementation of water 
use restrictions can be 
logistically difficult to 
implement and politically 
unpopular 
.025 (%) 
Net present 
cost of 
infrastructure 
investment 
The discounted costs of all new 
infrastructure development over the 
course of the simulation (2015-2060), 
averaged over all 1000 simulations 
A measure of the total cost 
of infrastructure 
development required by a 
given policy pathway 
$50MM 
Peak 
financial 
costs 
The highest annual costs over the 
course of the simulation (2015-2060) 
that represent the sum of annual debt 
service (30-year bonds at 5% interest), 
plus the costs of mitigating financial 
risk (contingency fund contribution 
and insurance contract costs), 
averaged over all 1000 simulations 
The peak financial costs 
reflect the largest single-
year burden that policy 
pathways will have on 
annual utility budgets, 
which can have a larger 
effect on utility decisions 
than net present value 
.005 (%) 
Financial risk The sum of revenue shortfalls and 
transfer costs exceeding available 
mitigation funds that have a 1% 
probability of being exceeded in a 
single simulation year (higher value in 
only 10 of 1000 simulations) 
Utilities are vulnerable to 
large swings in revenue 
and/or costs, and managers 
have indicated annual 
revenue swings as low as 
3% of annual revenue 
could be difficult to 
manage and 5-10% could 
be catastrophic 
.005(%) 
Jordan Lake 
allocation 
The percentage of Jordan Lake 
collectively allocated to all four 
utilities 
How much of Jordan Lake 
should be allocated, and to 
whom, is an important 
policy question 
.025 (%) 
 
Table 8: Model objectives 
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Supply reliability measures the probability that total reservoir storage will remain above 
the ‘failure point’ used in ROF calculations (20% of total capacity) in all weeks during a given 
year.  Each simulation year is assigned a separate reliability value, in which the probability is 
equal to the percentage of the 1000 simulations that maintain storage greater than 20% of 
capacity during every week of that year.  The supply reliability objective is determined to be the 
least reliable year over the course of the simulation, such that 
max 𝑓𝑅𝐸𝐿 = min𝑗 [min𝑦 (∑
𝑉𝑖,𝑗,𝑦
1000
1000
𝑖=1 )]      (2) 
where V = 0 if there was a week where reservoir storage drops below 20% of 
capacity and = 1 if not; y = year index, y = 1, 2, 3, ….. 46; i = simulation index, i 
= 1, 2, 3, …. 1000; j = utilty index, j = 1, 2, 3, 4; 
Utilities also expressed a need to measure the extent to which solutions made use of 
temporary water use restrictions.  This measure is included to capture a utility desire to minimize 
the burden placed on consumers, with whom these measures are unpopular, as well as to avoid 
the continual imposition of these measures which utility managers indicated was an 
administrative challenge (more so than their length or severity). The restriction frequency 
objective measures the percentage of years during a simulation in which at least one week of 
restrictions are implemented, such that  
min 𝑓𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑄 = max𝑗 [∑ ∑
𝑈𝑖,𝑗,𝑦
46∗1000
46
𝑦=1
1000
𝑖=1 ]    (3) 
where U = 1 if there was a week where water use restrictions were implemented 
and 0 if not 
 The Jordan Lake allocation objective measures how much of Jordan Lake will 
collectively need to be allocated to utilities in support of transfers.  Currently, Cary uses a Jordan 
Lake allocation as its primary water source and Durham and OWASA also have allocations 
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although they cannot currently access them except through Cary’s system.  A large part of the 
Jordan Lake water supply pool is unallocated, and this unallocated portion is of interest as state 
regulators decide on increasing potential allocations to regional municipalities.  The Jordan Lake 
allocation measures the collective sum of municipal allocations, such that 
min 𝑓𝐽𝐿𝐴 =  ∑
𝐴𝑗
𝐶𝐿
4
𝑗=1        (4) 
where A = Jordan Lake allocation (MG); and CL =  the municipal water supply 
capacity of Jordan Lake (MG) 
The expected net present cost of infrastructure investment metric measures the total net 
present cost of infrastructure investment across all four utilities.  The total regional infrastructure 
investment is averaged over all 1000 simulations and discounted to 2015, such that 
max 𝑓𝑁𝑃𝐶 =  ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
𝐶𝑌𝑖,𝑗,𝑦,𝑜×𝐷𝐶𝑗,𝑜
1000∗(1.05)𝑦−1
𝑛𝑗
𝑜=1
46
𝑦=1
1000
𝑖=1
4
𝑗=1    (5) 
where  o = infrastructure option index, o = 1, 2, 3, …. nj;  CY = 1 if an individual 
infrastructure option o is triggered for utility j in year y of simulation i  and  = 0 if 
it is not; DC = the development costs for infrastructure option o of utility j 
 The peak financing costs objective reflects how infrastructure development and drought 
mitigation costs will affect utility budgets, which can have a larger effect on utility decisions 
than net present value.  Utilities typically pay for large infrastructure investments using long-
term bonds, which allow them to spread out costs over a long period.  Here, we assume any new 
infrastructure development is financed through bonds which are repaid by utilities using constant 
payments over 30 years at an interest rate of 5%.  In addition to debt service payments, peak 
financing costs also include the annual costs of self- and third-party insurance schemes used to 
mitigate the variable costs of restrictions and transfers.  The peak financing cost objective is 
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determined to be mean across all simulations of the highest single-year debt service payment and 
mitigation payment over the planning period as a percentage of total annual revenue, such that 
max 𝑓𝑃𝐹𝐶 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑗 ∑ 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑦 [
𝐷𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑗,𝑦+𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑗,𝑦+𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑗𝑦
1000∗𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑦
]1000𝑖=1    (6) 
where DSP = annual debt service payment ($); AC = annual contribution to the 
contingency fund ($); CC = insurance contract cost ($); and TR = total annual 
volumetric revenue ($) 
where DSP is the constant 30-year repayment for all lump sum loan made prior to 
the current model date, at a 5% interest rate, such that 
𝐷𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑗,𝑦 = ∑ ∑
[𝐶𝑌𝑖,𝑗,𝑦𝑐×𝐷𝐶𝑗,𝑜]×0.05
1−(1.05)−30
𝑦
y𝑐=max (y−30,0)
𝑛𝑗
𝑜=1    (7) 
 Utilities are also concerned with the effect of financial variability caused by revenue 
losses from water use restrictions and the additional costs of water transfers that are uncovered 
by mitigation measures, so an additional metric is used to measure financial risk.  The financial 
risk objective measures the single-year revenue losses plus transfer costs (or ‘financial losses’) 
that have a 1% probability of beig exceeded during the course of a simulation run.  These 
financial losses are measured after the effects of mitigation, only considering those costs/revenue 
losses that exceed the available mitigation funds (available self-insurance plus index insurance 
payments), such that  
min 𝑓𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 =  𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑗[(𝑆𝑌𝐶𝑖: 𝑃{𝑆𝑌𝐶𝑖 > 𝑆𝑌𝐶} = 0.01)𝑗]   (8) 
where SYC is a measure of the maximum single-year drought management costs 
over the course of a single 46-year simulation run, such that 
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𝑆𝑌𝐶𝑖,𝑗 = max𝑦
(max (𝑅𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑦+𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑗,𝑦−𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑗,𝑦−𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑗,𝑦 ,0)
𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑦
   (9) 
Where RL = revenue losses from water use restrictions ($); TC = transfer costs 
($); CP = insurance contract payout ($); and CF = available contingency funds ($) 
4.2.3 Parallel & Self-Adaptive Evolutionary Multiobjective Optimization 
Overall the six objective formulations encompassed in equations 2-9 above present a 
significant design challenge where between 47-57 decision variables must be set to fully define 
possible integrated policy pathways.  In this study, a multiobjective evolutionary algorithm 
(MOEA) is used to explore the space of possible pathways and quantify the tradeoffs that emerge 
between the six objectives.  More formally, the optimal tradeoffs discovered by the MOEA 
represent the Pareto-approximate (or non-dominated) set of solutions.  MOEAs have been 
applied to a variety of complex water resources engineering problems, with specific applications 
to, among others, groundwater monitoring, water resource system design, and hydrologic model 
calibration (Nicklow et al., 2010).  This study makes use of the parallel Multi-Master Borg 
MOEA (Hadka and Reed, 2015; Reed and Hadka, 2014), which employs multiple operators 
adaptively selected based on a demonstrated probability of improvement over the course of the 
optimization process.  As a result, the Borg algorithm is able to select the most appropriate 
operators for a given problem and has demonstrated superior performance for difficult 
optimization problems including stochastic water portfolio planning (Reed et al., 2013).  The 
Borg algorithm also uses 𝜀-dominance archiving (Laumanns, 2002), which allows the user to 
control the resolution of the solution set and provides theoretical guarantees of convergence to a 
diverse approximation of the Pareto approximate set (Rudolph and Agapie, 2000; Laumanns, 
2002; Reed et al., 2013).  This 𝜀-dominance defines precision for each objective, dividing the 
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solution space into n-dimensional ‘blocks’ (where n is the number of objectives) that contain at 
most one solution per block. 
4.2.4 Computational Experiment 
An ensemble of 1000 unique simulations is used to calculate the objective values for a 
single function evaluation (FE) in order to adequately characterize the ‘dry tail’ of the 
streamflow distribution that typically drives the water supply planning process.  However, due to 
the much larger (>250,000) number of FE needed to develop a six-dimensional Pareto-
approximate solution set in each of the three formulations, each FE used during an optimization 
run exploited 100 simulations sampled from the larger set of 1000 simulations.  These 100 
simulations represent the ‘worst case’ streamflow records, defined as those streamflow records 
that resulted in the most frequent failures (total storage < 20% of capacity) under the current 
conditions (no new management or infrastructure decisions triggered, no demand growth over 
46-year simulation record).  This subset of the larger simulation ensemble ensures that the 
decision pathways are designed with respect to extreme conditions, as is essentially the case in 
almost all current utility decision making.  From a computational perspective, our approach 
exploits the Borg MOEA’s demonstrated capability to evolve high quality Pareto approximations 
with relatively modest Monte Carlo samples (Reed et al., 2013; Reed and Hadka, 2014; 
Kasprzyk et al., 2013; Herman et al., 2014).  Once the Pareto-approximate set is generated, the 
solution sets are re-run under the full 1000 simulation ensemble to ensure that solution objective 
values reflect a distribution representative of the historical record.  Parallelization was also used 
to dramatically reduce the ‘wall-clock time’ required for each run of the Borg MOEA.  This 
strategy enabled the compression of millions of hours of computing time into the span of a few 
days, a process that is becoming more prevalent even in independent utility planning processes 
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(Basdekas, 2014).  This study was performed on the Texas Advanced Computing Center’s 
(TACC) Stampede Cluster (http//www.taccutexas.edu/stampede), where each formulation was 
run on 16,384 processing cores. 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Objective value tradeoffs: Benefits of Utility Cooperation  
Figure 15 provides a detailed analysis of the tradeoffs that emerge across the no 
cooperation (red), weak cooperation (green), and strong cooperation (blue) formulations.  The 
six objective tradeoffs are captured using parallel axes plots (Inselberg, 2009).  In the plots, each 
axis represents the range of values attained for each of the six objectives plotted so that 
uniformly moving downward is preferred.  Each single line represents a candidate regional 
infrastructure portfolio where its point of intersection on the vertical axes designates its resulting 
performance in each of the objectives.  Diagonal lines between the objective axes designate 
strong tradeoffs between those objective pairs.  The ideal solution in Figure 15 would be 
ahorizontal line at the bottom of each panel.  Any movement upward on the vertical axes 
designates required compromises between objectives.  Figure 15A shows the full suite of 
tradeoffs within and across the three formulations. Some clear trends emerge in Figure 15A as 
the degree of regional cooperation increases.  The no cooperation (red) solutions are limited in 
their reliability, have significantly higher net present value costs, and require extremely high 
restriction frequencies relative to other formulations.  Figure 15B highlights the solutions that 
meet the reliability, restriction frequency, and financial risk performance requirements elicited 
from utility personnel.  In the figure, any solutiosn that fail to meet the utilities’ requirements are 
brushed out and shown in grey.  All of the Research Triangle utilities indicated that integrated 
planning pathways with less than 99% reliability would be considered unacceptable.  For reasons 
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related to administrative challenges and their unpopularity with customers, utilities also desired 
to limit the frequency with which they impose temporary water use restrictions to once every 
five years (restriction frequency < 20%).  Highly variable costs and revenues have the potential 
to disrupt the budgetary process, and utility managers have described financial losses greater 
than 10% of the utility’s annual volumetric revenue as catastrophic, thus solutions that impose 
any risk greater than this are also deemed unacceptable.  Applying these constraints to the 
Pareto-approximate solution sets generated in each formulation shrinks the feasible solution 
space considerably. It is also of interest to note that solutions from the ‘no cooperation’ 
formulation drop out of the space completely, as is shown in the difference between Figures 15A 
and 15B.  This is an important finding because the no cooperation formulation represents the 
status quo for current planning scenarios in the region.  In particular, the no cooperation 
solutions could not simultaneously meet the constraints on reliability and restriction frequency, 
suggesting that utilities will have to significantly increase their willingness to subject consumers 
to mandatory water use restrictions if they plan to develop independent water supply plans. 
The benefits of cooperation can be observed clearly by examining a representative 
solution from each formulation (Figure 15C).  All three solutions have the same reliability 
(99.3%) and meet the utility-elicited constraint on financial risk (<10% of annual volumetric 
revenue), while only the weak- and strong- cooperation solutions meet the restriction frequency 
constraint (<20% of total years).  In addition, both cooperative solutions show large 
improvements over the no cooperation solution with respect to expected net present cost of 
infrastructure investment and peak annual cost.  The strong cooperation solution also shows a 
large improvement over the weak cooperation solution with respect to the peak annual cost  
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Figure 15: Objective values for all solutions in all three formulations (A), objective values for 
solutions that meet utility requirements (reliability > 99%, worst case cost overruns < 10%, and 
restriction frequency < 20%) (B), and objective values for a single representative solution from 
each formulation (C).  Only cooperative formulations produced solutions that met all utility 
requirements. 
 
objective, but a smaller improvement with respect to the expected net present cost solution, in 
part because the peak financial cost metric includes the costs of mitigating the financial 
variability caused by restrictions and transfers.  This is because the jointly developed regional 
 103  
 
water treatment plant used in the strong cooperation formulation allows Durham, Raleigh, and 
OWASA to access their Jordan Lake allocations without purchasing them from Cary, reducing 
their transfer costs and the associated costs of reducing these utilities’ financial risk. In addition 
to increasing the overall capacity to transfer Jordan Lake water throughout the region, the 
regional plant acts as something of a ‘financial option’ for utilities.  Instead of paying volumetric 
rates to Cary, utilities pay the upfront costs to build the treatment plant so they can have direct 
access to Jordan Lake.  It should be noted that operations and management costs are not included 
in this model, but the volumetric costs of water production (power, chemicals) are significantly 
lower than the costs of buying transfers from Cary.   
The cost improvements observed with increasing cooperation in Figures 5B and 5C are, 
however, dependent on increased access to Jordan Lake.  This trend is shown clearly across the 
three highlighted solutions in Figure 15C.  In Figure 16, all of the solutions that meet the utility 
constraints (the same solutions highlighted in Figure 15B) are plotted with respect to two 
objectives, peak annual costs and Jordan Lake allocation.  The strong cooperation formulation 
creates some solutions that are able to meet these constraints at a lower peak annual cost than the 
weak cooperation formulation, but only if these solutions also have high Jordan Lake allocations.  
All of the strong cooperation solutions with lower costs than any weak cooperation solutions 
have Jordan Lake allocations rising over 72% of the available water supply, and most of them 
have Jordan Lake allocations of over 80%.  This result makes sense, as the regional water 
treatment plant allows utilities to access Jordan Lake at higher rates, but also is a very interesting 
result from a regional policy perspective, as the North Carolina Department of Environment and 
Natural Resources are currently considering new requests for Jordan Lake allocations from 
individual municipalities.  These results show the importance of these negotiations to 
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cooperative regional water supply planning as currently, Durham, OWASA, and Cary have a 
combined 50.5% allocation to Jordan Lake, and Raleigh has none. 
 
Figure 16: Solutions that meet utility requirements (reliability > 99%, worst case cost overruns < 
10%, and restriction frequency < 20%), as a function of peak financing costs and Jordan Lake 
allocation.  Strong cooperation produces solutions that meet utility requirements at a lower cost 
than weak cooperation, but only when Jordan Lake allocations are above a given threshold. 
 
4.3.2 Probabilistic Decision Pathways 
 Each of the solutions illustrated in Figure 15 represents a specific dynamic adaptive 
policy pathway.  These pathways encompass a set of infrastructure and management triggers that 
define how each of the four utilities will respond to changing hydrologic and demand conditions 
through time.  New infrastructure development can be visualized as vertical movement along a 
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pathway that moves horizontally in time, resulting in the subway-style maps in Figures 7 and 8.  
It should be noted that OWASA and Cary pathways are not shown here because their actions 
have little effect on regional objective values.  Population growth in Durham and Raleigh drive 
the need for infrastructure development and increased levels of water transfers throughout the 
region, a result consistent with previous work in the region (Zeff et al., 2014, Herman et al., 
2014).  Management methods, including conservation (Figures 7B and 8B) and transfers (Figures 
7C and 8C) occur as utilities move along their infrastructure pathways.  Changes in risk caused 
by new infrastructure, demand growth, and new streamflow observations are all reflected in the 
probability that management methods will be used at a given point along this pathway, as shown 
with the sliding colorbar.  Even though each solution is associated with a specific set of decision 
variables, the integrated pathways can change depending on the specific hydrologic conditions 
that are observed over the course of the simulation.  Thus, when examined with respect to 1000 
unique simulations, the actual decisions are probabilistic.  Each of the 1000 simulations involves 
a different streamflow record, and the risk-of-failure calculations that are used to make 
infrastructure and management decisions can vary from simulation to simulation.  The 
appearance (or not) of severe droughts during this period can have a large impact on individual 
utility decisions.  For example, in Figure 17, most simulations in the weak cooperation solution 
show Durham using a mixture of restrictions and transfers to meet its objectives with its existing 
(status quo) infrastructure, and then developing an expanded Lake Michie reservoir, after which 
point very few restrictions or transfers are needed, as reflected in the blue coloring of the 
pathway in Figures 7B and 7C.  In a small minority of simulations, however, droughts 
experienced in the early years of the simulation increase Durham’s long-term ROF beyond the 
trigger threshold before the permitting period for the Lake Michie expansion ends, meaning that 
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it is not available for construction.  In this case, another, smaller, infrastructure development, the 
expansion of Teer Quarry, is pursued.  This additional storage allows Durham’s long-term ROF 
to remain under the threshold until the permitting period for the Lake Michie expansion has 
finished.  It should be noted that the effects of extreme drought that caused Durham’s decision to 
expand Teer Quarry carries over into their further decisions, as well.  In most simulations, the 
decision to expand Lake Michie does not occur until at least 2037, but in simulations in which 
Teer Quarry has been expanded, the Lake Michie expansion occurs by 2035 at the latest, even 
though Durham has access to additional storage in Teer Quarry.  After this extreme drought has 
been observed in the ‘historical record’, the system appears to be under greater risk, even though 
streamflow records are generated to reflect a stationary hydrology.  While seeming perhaps a bit 
arbitrary given advanced knowledge of a stationary hydrology over the planning period, this 
process would seem to be more reflective of a decision making process that might play out as 
events unfolded and current information was continually updated.  If it can be assumed that 
utilities establish risk thresholds on which to base their decisions, the true nature of this risk is 
subject to some uncertainty and streamflow observations only serve as an estimate of the ‘real’ 
distributions on which this risk is measured.  In this way, the decision making process would be 
identical regardless of whether a particularly dry period were the result of non-stationarity or 
simply a statistical anomaly, and thus this continually updating estimate of risk is probably more 
reflective of how decision might be made over the planning period.   
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Figure 17: Probabilistic policy pathways under weak cooperation.  The transparency of an 
individual pathway represents the probability (based on the percentage of simulations) it will be 
taken.  The panels B and C also show how pathway changes alter the usage of water use 
restrictions and transfers, respectively, over the course of a simulation. 
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 The permitting period for new infrastructure development can also play a part in how 
short-term management methods are used.  In Figure 17, Raleigh employs restrictions under the 
status quo infrastructure state but after the first of three infrastructure options are developed, very 
few restrictions (and transfers) are used.  In this pathway, Raleigh’s long-term ROF thresholds 
are triggered relatively early, but they have no infrastructure options that reach the end of their 
permitting period before 2030.  Therefore, both their short- and long-term ROF grows, and 
restrictions are used extensively during that period.  After 2030, Raleigh has a number of 
infrastructure options available, and they can be built in relatively quick succession, before 
restrictions are triggered by short-term ROF. 
 In the strong cooperation scenario (Figure 18), the addition of a regional option alters the 
integrated pathways available to the utilities.  Here, Durham does not develop any of their 
individual infrastructure options, using transfers from Cary and the regional water treatment 
plant to meet growing demand, as seen in Figure 18C.  Durham relies more heavily on transfers 
from Cary than they do in the weak cooperation example, and this strategy, in combination with 
the Jordan Lake water being used via the regional water treatment plant, requires significantly 
higher Jordan Lake allocations.  Raleigh does not use transfers from Cary, allowing Durham to 
use more of Cary’s treatment and conveyance capacity, but instead Raleigh accesses its Jordan 
Lake allocation through the regional water treatment plant.  Raleigh also uses restrictions 
throughout the entire probabilistic pathway, as seen by the green and yellow coloring in Figure 
18B.  In most simulations, Raleigh only builds one of their individual infrastructure options, but 
in some cases a second (Little River Reservoir) needs to be developed.  Both the ‘initial’ and (in 
most cases) the ‘expanded’ regional water treatment plants are built in this example as well, but 
their construction helps avoid the construction of other surface water storage options. 
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Figure 18: Probabilistic policy pathways under strong cooperation.  The transparency of an 
individual pathway represents the probability (based on the percentage of simulations) it will be 
taken.  The panels B and C also show how pathway changes alter the usage of water use 
restrictions and transfers, respectively, over the course of a simulation. 
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4.4 Discussion 
These results have important implications that can be generalized beyond the Research 
Triangle in North Carolina.  As water managers begin to embrace a more diversified approach to 
mitigating drought, the various alternatives available for use carry individual, often conflicting 
objectives.  If these alternatives are not evaluated systematically as part of an interconnected 
‘portfolio’, the tradeoffs between these objectives could remain hidden and managers may not 
even be aware that their goals cannot be met under status quo approaches.  When these failures 
are illuminated, they can often be catalysts that push decision-makers towards options that would 
otherwise be met with resistance, such as cooperation among actors that traditionally value self-
reliance.  However, in order to adequately illustrate these shortcomings, tools are required that 
can properly model how disparate adaptive measures are integrated with more traditional water 
supply infrastructure sequencing.  These tools need to be able to describe water management as a 
path-dependent process, one in which the risk-based decisions incorporate new information 
about deeply uncertain conditions as they unfold.  Instead of attempting to optimize actions, 
models should develop rules for integrating and reacting to new information and then develop 
plans for mitigating the results of those actions (e.g. financial variability, environmental 
concerns, customer unpopularity).  One particularly powerful way of demonstrating this is 
through solving progressively more complex problem formulations, in which improvements in 
decision-maker objectives can be shown through the addition of actions, tools, or frameworks for 
cooperation.  In this way, policy and engineering recommendations can be made in the context of  
models that more accurately represent how these changes would affect decisions made in an 
adaptive environment that is responsive to new information. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
Water supply policies that integrate infrastructure development with short-term 
management actions like conservation and transfers will be vital tools that enable municipal 
water utilities to make long-term plans in the face of large uncertainties in a number of key 
planning variables.  More adaptive management tools such as these can be used to augment 
existing infrastructure, and infrastructure decisions can then be made with the intent of 
increasing the effectiveness of these management tools, especially those that might require the 
movement of water between users, such as the expansion of treatment and/or conveyance 
capacities.  In this study, risk-based triggers were used to sequence integrated policy pathways 
that incorporated the impact of time-evolving model decisions on regional water supply needs. 
Results indicate that cooperative development of new infrastructure and management schemes 
can help utilities in the Research Triangle of North Carolina achieve water supply performance 
objectives and much of this is likely generalizable to many regional scenarios, particularly in the 
Eastern United States.  Solutions not involving some level of cooperation were not able to 
achieve utility goals, and ‘strong’ cooperation that integrated management actions and 
infrastructure development produced solutions that met utility goals at lower costs.  The results 
regarding cooperation in particular are could be generalizable to other regions.  The 
interdependent choices that are made add complexity to the planning process, and important 
tradeoffs exist between utilities individually pursuing their own individual self-interest and 
limiting the overall development, financial risk, and frequency with which water use restrictions 
are implemented.  Although water utilities often highly value their independence and self-
sufficiency, the regional benefits from cooperation suggest there is room for contracts and 
financial agreements to improve outcomes.  These insights were made possible using a 
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framework of multiple problem formulations that gradually expanded the role of cooperation in 
regional water supply planning.  Multi-objective parallel search allowed for the discovery of 
high-quality integrated policy pathways that coordinated action across a number of regional 
water utilities.  The results could generally be used to make the case that regional cooperation 
has the potential to increase the diversity of available water supply options, strengthening 
drought policies provide robustness through multiple, adaptive approaches to water scarcity.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTION 
 Adaptive techniques, such as demand management and water transfers, are likely to play 
a large role in the water management plans of the future.  Diversified water supply portfolios that 
include adaptive options can reduce the costs of developing high-reliability plans with less 
overall development.  Adaptive techniques can also provide greater adaptability to ‘non-
stationary’ hydrologic conditions, but can also present utilities with a number of planning 
challenges as they move away from more predictable infrastructure-centric approaches.  This 
dissertation develops a number of problem formulations that quantify the potentially 
destabilizing financial risks introduced by adaptive techniques, illustrate the resulting need for 
financial mitigation tools, and provide a framework for integrating these adaptive measures into 
long-term infrastructure sequencing plans.  We show that important benchmarks elicited from 
utilities related to reliability, the impact of water use restrictions, and financial risk cannot be met 
in the short-term under status quo conditions, requiring both cooperation through inter-utility 
water transfers and financial mitigation tools to meet their self-imposed constraints.  The 
significant impact of financial risk suggests that reliability studies without an explicit accounting 
of financial risk may lead to the discovery of solutions that are actually infeasible in practice, 
particularly when least-cost optimization techniques are used.    
We show how utilities can use self-insurance and a novel form of third-party index 
insurance to protect against financial risk, but utilities can also use drought surcharges to 
mitigate some of the lost revenue that occurs during periods of conservation.  Pricing surcharges 
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are beneficial to utilities because they simultaneously encourage more efficient forms of 
conservation, relative to those achieved through mandated outdoor use restrictions, and provide 
utilities with additional revenue to make up for shortfalls caused by conservation.  However, 
when the incentives created by the desire to avoid financial risk are considered, surcharges could 
cause utilities to avoid purchasing transfers in favor of enacting surcharge-based conservation, 
potentially harming consumers by subjecting them to unnecessary welfare losses.  These 
incentives extend to investment in the infrastructure needed to support transfers across a region, 
potentially reducing the extent to which transfers could be employed.   
In general, the relationship between short-term adaptive management policies and long-
term infrastructure sequence planning has been overlooked.  Planning studies are typically made 
without considering the impact of adaptive techniques, and strategies for using conservation and 
water transfers are typically developed in a static environment.  As adaptive strategies become a 
larger part of water supply planning, the interaction between short-term management and 
infrastructure planning will become more important.  We develop a framework based on risk-
based triggers that are used to sequence integrated policy pathways that incorporated the impact 
of time-evolving model decisions on regional water supply needs.  The risk-based triggers 
provide a quantitative basis for adaptation to significant future uncertainties, integrating short- 
and long-term decisions and enabling significant levels of cooperation between multiple 
stakeholders within the model.  This work demonstrates how adaptive techniques can be fully 
integrated into the water planning process for a group of water utilities in the ‘Research Triangle’ 
of North Carolina, but the results are broadly generalizable to a growing portion of municipal 
regions that are characterized by growing demands, uncertain future conditions, and increasing 
constraints on expanding traditional supply sources. 
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The work presented here raises new questions which could further improve the 
performance of adaptive approaches to water supply management.  It is clear that the 
destabilizing effect of weather-related financial risk has caught the attention of the credit rating 
agencies, but it is unclear exactly how exposure to this risk factors into their evaluations.  Many 
agency guidelines for water utilities revolve around traditional risk metrics which do not 
necessarily measure exposure to drought risks, like debt service coverage ratio or days of cash on 
hand.  It seems that the agencies are set up to reactively respond to financial risk from drought 
and do not send clear signals to utilities that their efforts to proactively mitigate drought risk will 
be reflected in their credit ratings.  If measures of financial risk are to become a more important 
design metric for water utility drought management plans, then researchers need to better 
understand how the behavior of credit rating agencies is incentivizing water utility actions, 
potentially creating blind spots in their approach to risk management.  It will be important to 
identify areas in which credit ratings could improve their assessments to encourage more 
proactive planning on the part of water utilities. 
Third-party index insurance could be a very useful tool for mitigating the low-
probability, high-magnitude financial risk from extreme drought, but one drawback of the 
insurance as it is presented here is that the contracts require an individualized structure and 
indices in order to reduce their basis risk.  This has the potential to be less cost-effective than 
more generalizable contracts.  Two potential changes could be made to the structure of the 
insurance product to overcome these problems.  The first could be to find systems which effect 
many different users in similar ways, such as the State Water Project (SWP) and Central Valley 
Project (CVP) in California.  These systems share storage and conveyance infrastructure to move 
water from Northern to Southern California.  The volume of water moved each year is dependent 
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on drought conditions throughout the state and is a significant source of financial risk for a large 
number of institutions in Southern California that are dependent on the imports.  If a metric, or 
series of metrics, could be identified that correlate well with the water delivered by the 
SWP/CVP, generalizable insurance contracts could be developed for which there could be a 
demand from many users.  Conversely, we could also design insurance products with indices that 
are as broadly applicable as possible.  In the as-yet-unpublished work of Baum and Characklis, 
drought indices are developed that could apply to a geographically diverse set of water utilities.  
This geographical diversity reduces the correlation of payouts to the entire insured pool, 
requiring less overhead capital used to underwrite a given magnitude of exposure, reducing the 
risk premiums associated with the contracts.  The premium reduction here is dependent on the 
correlation of payouts across the entire pool, so these schemes are characterized by makeup of 
potential buyers.  The makeup of the insurance pool could potentially be affected by the 
insurance indicies offered and the pricing of the subsequent contracts.  Calculating how these 
parameters will affect insurance demand and how they can be calibrated to produce optimal 
pools of insurance buyers will be useful information to those attempting to market this type of 
insurance product. 
In our adaptive systems, both short- and long-term decisions are made in response to a set 
of rules.  These rules reflect assumptions about risk that are constantly being updated based on 
new information.  How this new information is integrated into measures of risk will be an 
important design parameter for long-term plans in systems that are widely believed to be non-
stationary, due to changing climate and urbanization patterns.  For instance, water supply 
infrastructure is designed for the most extreme events, typically the worst drought on record.  In 
a stationary environment, the most extreme drought on record would be a suitable indicator of 
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risk to a system, and once growing demands stress the infrastructure beyond a given threshold 
under the most extreme drought conditions, infrastructure expansion is considered.  In a non-
stationary environment however, defining decision metrics using only observations of the most 
extreme events may make them slow to identify important changes in the underlying risk.  If 
changes to climate/land use doubled the probability of the 100-year drought, we would still only 
expect to observe a drought of that magnitude every 50 years.  Until an event at least this strong 
occurs, our decision metrics would not reflect this change, even though the actual risk is much 
larger (i.e. the infrastructure would not be able to meet demands during a ‘true’ 100-year 
drought).   However, it is likely that the changes to climate/land use would have an observable 
effect on more moderate droughts during this period.  If decision metrics can be expanded to 
consider these changes, they could perhaps provide proactive adaptation that allows the system 
to respond before an extreme event is experienced.  Linking observable changes to moderate 
droughts with potential changes to extreme droughts would allow adaptive approaches to 
respond better to non-stationary conditions.  This represents another potential area where 
iterative feedback between hydrologic science and water resource engineering could improve 
social outcomes. 
Adaptive water resource systems will reduce the cost and environmental impact of 
providing reliable water supplies to a rapidly urbanizing population subject to deep uncertainties 
about future hydrologic conditions.  However, the ability to adapt to changing conditions also 
increases the complexity of the decision space for water managers, introducing tradeoffs between 
financial and operational objectives.  This dissertation demonstrates how efforts to reach 
performance goals within the context of these tradeoffs have the potential to impact the water 
management institutions that have developed under significantly different conditions of scarcity.  
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The results shown here suggest that these systems are highly path-dependent, with the financial 
repercussions of management decisions potentially having an impact on the long-term ability of 
institutions to adapt to changing conditions.  Decisions made within these more complex, path-
dependent systems have the potential to cause downward spirals, where the tradeoffs between 
objectives deteriorate over time.  In order to implement adaptive water resource systems to their 
full potential, planning studies will need to move beyond least-cost, static optimization and begin 
to use models that have the ability to integrate new information into the decision-making process 
as it occurs.  
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APPENDIX 1: MODEL SOURCE CODE 
Source code for the Triangle Regional Water Supply Model is publically available at: 
https://github.com/hbz5000/TheRealTriangleWaterSupply 
Source code for the Borg multi-objective evolutionary algorithm can be obtained (free for 
academic and other non-commercial uses) at: http://borgmoea.org/ 
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APPENDIX 2: BORG PARAMETERIZATION 
 
Parameter Value 
Initial population size 100 
Tournament selection size 2 
SBX rate 1.0 
SBX distribution index 15.0 
DE crossover rate 1.0 
DE step size 0.5 
PCX parents 3 
PCX offspring 2 
PCX eta 0.1 
PCX zeta 0.1 
SPX parents 3 
SPX offspring 2 
SPX epsilon 2 
UNDX parents 3 
UNDX offspring 2 
UNDX eta 0.5 
UNDX zeta 0.5 
UM rate 1/number of DV 
PM rate 1/number of DV 
PM distribution index 20 
Table 9: Runtime parameters for the Borg MOEA 
  
  
